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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AS CONTESTATORY 
DEMOCRACY
GLEN STASZEWSKI*
ABSTRACT
This Article provides a novel solution to the countermajoritarian
difficulty in statutory interpretation by applying recent insights from
civic republican theory to the adjudication of statutory disputes in
the modern regulatory state. From a republican perspective, freedom
consists of the absence of the potential for arbitrary domination, and
democracy should therefore include both electoral and contestatory
dimensions. The Article argues that statutory interpretation in the
modern regulatory state is best understood as a mechanism of
contestatory democracy. It develops this conception of statutory
interpretation by considering the distinct roles of legislatures,
administrative agencies, and courts in making and implementing the
law. The Article claims that this understanding of statutory
interpretation is both descriptively accurate and normatively
attractive, and it explores some of the most important implications
of recharacterizing statutory interpretation in this fashion. Specifi-
cally, this understanding of statutory interpretation sheds new light
on the most fundamental problems with textualism, and it provides
reasons to give serious consideration to proposals for increased
judicial candor in statutory interpretation and for judicial review of
at least some types of legislation for due process of law making.
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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional theorists have devoted considerable attention to
the question of what, if anything, justifies the power of judicial rev-
iew in a democracy.1 The “countermajoritarian difficulty” questions
the legitimacy of an unelected judiciary’s authority to invalidate the
policy decisions of elected representatives of the people.2 This
problem is unlikely to go away any time soon, considering persistent
charges of “judicial activism” against the Rehnquist3 and Roberts
Courts.4
Meanwhile, the democratic legitimacy of judicial law making in
statutory interpretation has received far less attention. This
disparity in treatment likely stems from the traditional view that
courts do not engage in law making when they interpret statutes.
Rather, courts are obligated to serve as faithful agents of the
legislature, and thereby carry out the legislature’s decisions.5 The
judiciary’s authority to interpret statutes is easy to square with
democracy from this perspective, because elected officials who are
politically accountable to the people are making all of the important
policy decisions.6
The traditional view has been difficult to sustain, however, for a
variety of reasons. First, the legal realist movement and contempo-
rary theories of interpretation have highlighted the inherent
ambiguity of language and the severe limitations on legislative
foresight.7 It is therefore widely accepted that the legislature does
not explicitly resolve every question that arises in statutory
interpretation, and that courts have considerable interpretative
1. See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Counter-
majoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002). 
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE
ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 203 (2004). 
4. Editorial, Activism and the Roberts Court, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.ny
times.com/2012/03/29/opinion/activism-and-the-roberts-court.html.
5. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 5 (2001). 
6. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in
Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594 (1995). 
7. See id. at 599, 602. 
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leeway. Second, the rise of the modern regulatory state has resulted
in widespread delegations of broad discretionary authority from the
legislature to other institutions, and a candid recognition that the
resolution of ambiguities in federal regulatory statutes necessarily
involves policy making.8 Third, recent developments in political
science have undermined the optimistic pluralistic conception of the
legislative process that underlay the traditional model, and called
into question the capacity of voters to hold elected officials account-
able for their policy decisions.9 These developments raise serious
questions about the cogency of faithful agent theory, and suggest
that the democratic legitimacy of statutory interpretation can no
longer be taken for granted. 
Partly in response to these developments, several prominent
scholars have rejected faithful agent theory and suggested that
courts should be understood as cooperative partners of the legisla-
ture in the process of statutory interpretation. These theorists
recognize the inevitability of judicial discretion in statutory
interpretation, and claim that courts can play a desirable role in (1)
updating statutes to reflect changed circumstances;10 (2) placing
needed limits on government administration and ensuring stability
and consistency in interpretation;11 (3) promoting background norms
that would improve the operation of government;12 or (4) facilitating
the integrity of the entire legal system.13 Although some of these
scholars have addressed the democratic legitimacy of a relatively
ambitious judicial role in statutory interpretation,14 it seems fair to
8. Cf. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
9. See Schacter, supra note 6, at 603-05. 
10. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 227-28 (1982); T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 42 (1988);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1480
(1987); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 541, 591 (1988). 
11. See Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A
Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW.
U. L. REV. 1239, 1246-47 (2002).
12. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405 (1989). 
13. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
14. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J.
353, 380-83 (1989) (describing and critiquing the arguments of Calabresi and Eskridge); infra
notes 81-85 and accompanying text. 
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say that those efforts have not been completely successful. Not only
are cooperative partner theories widely viewed as undemocratic, but
textualism—a more formal version of faithful agent theory than the
traditional model15—has been tremendously influential in recent
years precisely because it allegedly limits the judiciary’s policy-
making discretion.16
This Article contends that the solution to the countermajoritarian
difficulty in statutory interpretation17 can be found in recent litera-
ture on democratic theory, which returns to first principles and
identifies the most fundamental limitation on governmental
authority and the two essential dimensions of democracy. Specifi-
cally, Philip Pettit has set forth a republican conception of liberty as
non-domination, whereby freedom consists of the absence of the
possibility of arbitrary domination by others.18 Though government
promotes liberty under this view by protecting citizens from the
possibility of arbitrary domination by private parties, the govern-
ment can also be a potential source of arbitrary domination. It is
therefore essential for any society that values liberty to provide
structural safeguards to limit the possibility of arbitrary domination
by the state. Pettit claims that a republican democracy with two
essential dimensions is the form of government that is most
conducive to this understanding of freedom.19
Because government acts nonarbitrarily when it is “forced to
track the common, perceived interests of citizens,”20 Pettit claims
that “it is always better to have an arrangement under which the
possibility of government’s being indifferent to the common,
perceived interests of ordinary people is reduced or removed.”21 This
15. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2390
(2003). 
16. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26, 48
(2006).
17. This Article does not address the countermajoritarian difficulty in constitutional
theory, which raises some distinctive issues that stem, in part, from the difficulty of amending
the Constitution to override judicial decisions.
18. See PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 66
(1997). 
19. Philip Pettit, Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization, in DEMOCRACY’S
VALUE 164 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón eds., 1999). 
20. Id. at 173.
21. Id. at 172. 
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is the function periodic elections perform in a republican democracy.
Public officials are unlikely to win reelection if they are indifferent
to the collective interests of the people. Pettit recognizes, however,
that elections can provide only a limited protection against the
possibility of arbitrary domination, because electoral democracy is
not necessarily responsive to the interests and perspectives of
minorities:
Electoral democracy may mean that that government cannot be
wholly indifferent to popular perceptions about common
interests and that it cannot fail altogether to try and advance
those interests. But it is quite consistent with electoral democ-
racy that government should only track the perceived interests
of a majority, absolute or relative, on any issue and that it
should have a dominating aspect from the point of view of
others.22
In other words, the tyranny of the majority precludes the possibility
that electoral democracy is sufficient to ensure that government
preserves freedom as non-domination.23
Pettit therefore argues that democracy must also contain
mechanisms to ensure that the interests and perspectives of
minorities are considered. He points out that the most promising
solution to this concern is a procedure that would enable people to
call public decisions into question, “and to trigger a review; in
particular, to trigger a review in a forum that they and others can
all endorse as an impartial court of appeal: as a forum in which
relevant interests are taken equally into account and only impar-
tially supported decisions are upheld.”24 The complaint in a
contestatory regime of this nature is not that some people fared less
well than others as a result of a decision, but rather that the
decision was made in a manner that failed to take some interests or
perspectives equally into account. “The assumption behind the
complaint is that if those interests had been taken equally into
account, then the ultimate decision would have been different.”25
22. Id. at 174.
23. See id. at 176. 
24. Id. at 179. 
25. Id. at 180.
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Pettit claims that the electoral mode of democracy promotes
legitimacy because it ensures that governmental decisions originate,
“however indirectly, in the collective will of the people.”26 Signifi-
cantly, however, the contestatory mode of democracy further
improves the democratic legitimacy of those decisions to the extent
that they can withstand challenges brought by individuals in
appropriate institutional settings.27 Whereas the electoral mode of
democracy “gives the collective people an indirect power of author-
ship over the laws,” the contestatory mode of democracy “would give
the people, considered individually, a limited and, of course, indirect
power of editorship over those laws.”28 Pettit demonstrates that the
importance of contestatory democracy has been a prominent theme
in democratic theory since at least the seventeenth century,29 but he
also recognizes that this idea “has consistently played a secondary
role to the idea of putting government under popular, collective
control and it has ceded to that other idea a semantic connection
with the word ‘democracy.’”30 He argues that viewing as undemo-
cratic proposals to constrain government by protecting individual
rights or establishing mechanisms for individual challenge reflects
“a serious conceptual loss,”31 and that we should recognize that such
restrictions on collective power are not solely pragmatic in charac-
ter, but rather constitutive of the only understanding of democracy
that is properly connected to the requirements of individual
freedom.32 
After discussing relevant aspects of Pettit’s conception of
democracy,33 this Article argues that statutory interpretation in the
modern regulatory state is best understood as a mechanism of
contestatory democracy. I write against a contemporary backdrop in
which most issues of statutory interpretation in federal court arise
in the context of challenges to the validity of administrative action.34
One party is claiming that the government has exceeded the scope
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 172.
30. Id. at 184. 
31. Id.
32. Id. at 184-85. 
33. See infra Part II.
34. See infra notes 125-39 and accompanying text.
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of its lawful authority, whereas the government is alleging that the
manner in which it has chosen to implement a statute is both legally
permissible and reasonable as a policy matter. When a court decides
such a case or controversy, it is resolving a “contest” over the
permissible scope of governmental authority. In short, statutory
interpretation in federal court is typically a species of judicial
review of agency action—and a prototypical example of a mecha-
nism for contestatory democracy.35 Moreover, this conception of
statutory interpretation also holds in most cases where an adminis-
trative agency is not involved, including litigation that contests the
government’s understanding of criminal statutes. As such, statutory
interpretation is hardly a deviant institution in democracy; rather,
its availability promotes freedom as non-domination and is there-
fore vital to the legitimacy of specific exercises of governmental
authority in a post-New-Deal republican democracy.
The Article develops this conception of statutory interpretation as
contestatory democracy by considering the distinct roles of legisla-
tures, administrative agencies, and courts in the modern regulatory
state.36 The legislature is authorized by the Constitution to play the
primary authorial role in the lawmaking process, and this is
entirely legitimate because of the electoral dimension of democracy.
Both the constitutional structure and principles of democratic
legitimacy suggest that Congress should engage in reasoned
deliberation on which courses of action will promote the public good,
and that it should take the interests and perspectives of minorities
into account during the legislative process. If Congress has explicitly
resolved a particular issue pursuant to this process, the legislature’s
decision should ordinarily be respected by agencies and courts when
the statute is implemented, and potential challenges to the validity
of those decisions on statutory grounds will generally be unsuccess-
ful. If, however, Congress has not explicitly resolved an issue during
the legislative process or circumstances have materially changed,
agencies will generally have more authority to play an authorial or
robust editorial role when the statute is implemented. 
35. I will discuss the complexities of this claim infra in Part III.C., where I distinguish
between (1) judicial review of agency law making; (2) statutory interpretation without
agencies; and (3) statutory interpretation with agency guidance.
36. See infra Part III.
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When an agency’s interpretation of a statute is subsequently
challenged in court under these circumstances, the judiciary
performs an editorial role and examines whether the agency made
a reasoned decision. If so, the agency’s decision should be upheld; if
not, it should be vacated and remanded for further consideration
and potential revision. When there is no agency responsible for
implementing a statute or the responsible agency has not engaged
in reasoned deliberation on a matter, and Congress has not
explicitly resolved the question, the judiciary will necessarily play
a more robust editorial role if the proper understanding of the
statute is contested. The people are thereby provided with a variety
of different forums for potentially contesting legal or policy issues,
and individuals cannot be adversely affected by governmental action
unless a reasoned decision that considered their interests and
perspectives was provided at some point during the process.
This Article proposes a different way of thinking about statutory
interpretation, but it also provides a useful mechanism for under-
standing the existing empirical reality.37 First, understanding
statutory interpretation as contestatory democracy provides a
congenial home for the increasingly influential role of administra-
tive agencies, as well as a basis for properly understanding and
evaluating the scope of judicial review of agency action and the doc-
trines by which courts defer to the executive branch’s interpretation
of statutes. Second, this understanding of statutory interpretation
explains why federal courts have displayed a marked tendency to
forego consistent application of any foundational theory in favor of
an approach that resolves individual cases based on the application
of practical reasoning. In the course of this positive discussion, the
Article also provides some normative views on the proper level of
judicial deference to agency decision making, and explains why the
use of practical reasoning in statutory interpretation is both
normatively attractive and affirmatively democratic.
Finally, the Article describes some of the most important
implications of thinking about statutory interpretation as contest-
atory democracy, and identifies certain issues that deserve further
consideration.38 Specifically, the theory of statutory interpretation
37. See infra Part IV.
38. See infra Part V. 
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that is articulated in this Article undermines textualism because it
suggests that the law is more than the text that was enacted by the
legislature, and that the law includes decisions rendered over time
by officials in several institutions.39 Moreover, if we understand
statutory interpretation by the judiciary as a mechanism of
contestatory democracy, more factors will necessarily come into play
in reaching decisions than the meaning of statutory language. On
the other hand, contestatory democracy requires reasoned decision
making on legal and policy issues by public officials. While agency
decision making is typically reviewed by the judiciary for compliance
with this standard, the vision of statutory interpretation set forth
in this Article leaves more room for potential abuses of discretion by
Congress or the judiciary. This suggests a need to reassess previous
debates on the feasibility of judicial review of legislation for “due
process of law making,” as well as a potential need for greater
candor in judicial decision making.40 Although the judiciary’s
editorial role in statutory interpretation affirmatively promotes
democratic legitimacy by providing meaningful opportunities for
contestatory democracy, statutory interpretation best promotes
freedom as non-domination when the judiciary gives reasoned
explanations for its decisions that could reasonably be accepted by
people with fundamentally competing interests and perspectives.
In their recent book, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts, Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner emphatically
declare that “[o]riginalism is the only approach to text that is
compatible with democracy.”41 This Article provides an alternative
understanding of statutory interpretation and its democratic
legitimacy, which shows that the underlying premise of Scalia’s and
Garner’s theory is false. This alternative vision is based upon
fundamentally different understandings of freedom and democracy,
which are ultimately more compelling, partly because they recognize
that there is more to democracy than voting, and partly because
they embrace the notion that democratic authority should not be
exercised without listening and responding to the interests and
perspectives of all the people.
39. See infra Part V.A.
40. See infra Part V.B.
41. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 82 (2012).
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I. THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
The traditional understanding of statutory interpretation is that
the judiciary should serve as a faithful agent of the legislature.42 As
“honest agents of the political branches,” courts “carry out decisions
they do not make.”43 Because statutory interpretation implements
previous decisions by an elected legislature, and does not involve
creative law making by courts, the enterprise is consistent with,
and, indeed, affirmatively facilitates majoritarian democracy. If
Congress disagrees with a judicial decision or wants to change the
law for other reasons, it is the legislature’s responsibility to amend
the statute pursuant to the constitutionally mandated lawmaking
procedures. From this perspective, the democratic pedigree of
statutory interpretation is impeccable because elected officials who
are politically accountable to voters are making all of the important
policy decisions.
The dominant understanding of the best interpretive strategy for
a faithful agent of the legislature has gradually shifted over the
years in response to prevailing understandings of law and the
legislative process. The traditional view was that courts should
resolve interpretive disputes by ascertaining the intent of the
legislature with respect to the precise question at issue.44 The legal
realists, however, persuasively identified the difficulties associated
with attributing a single coherent intent to a multi-member body,
and the likelihood that many issues were not explicitly considered
or resolved by a majority of elected representatives during the
legislative process.45 In short, the legal realists recognized that the
notion of “legislative intent” is often a fiction and that courts
necessarily exercise substantial policy-making discretion when they
decide cases pursuant to traditional methods of statutory interpre-
42. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. 
43. Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 60 (1984). 
44. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
221 (2d ed. 2006); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 89 (1991).
45. See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930).
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tation.46 In the process, the legal realists identified a need for other
mechanisms to guide or constrain the judiciary—or for a theory that
could explain how the judiciary’s exercise of such policy-making
discretion is consistent with representative democracy.
To make a long story short, the alternative approaches or
foundational theories have not been completely successful. One
common technique that has been invoked by faithful agent theorists
when Congress does not have a readily ascertainable intent is to
engage in “imaginative reconstruction.”47 The idea is that the
judiciary should decide a statutory question based on what the
legislature would have intended if it had considered and resolved a
particular problem.48 This technique can potentially avoid absurd or
patently unreasonable results that the legislature likely would not
have intended,49 but critics have persuasively argued that the
technique is more “imaginative” than “reconstruction” in more
difficult cases.50 Accordingly, imaginative reconstruction necessarily
confers a great deal of policy-making discretion on the unelected
federal judiciary.
“Legal process theory,” which provided the dominant theory of
law and statutory interpretation after World War II and the
establishment of the modern regulatory state pursuant to the New
Deal, viewed such discretion as potentially beneficial and therefore
moved away from faithful agent theory and toward an understand-
ing of statutory interpretation as the “creative elaboration” of
meaning by judges.51 Henry Hart and Albert Sacks claimed in their
famous legal process materials that the judiciary’s role in statutory
interpretation “is to decide what meaning ought to be given to the
directions of the statute in the respects relevant to the case before
46. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950). 
47. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 44, at 226-28 (describing this approach); RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-93 (1985) (advocating imaginative
reconstruction).
48. See Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 381 (1907).
49. See Manning, supra note 15, at 2399-2402 (describing the intentionalist justification
for the absurdity doctrine). 
50. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 44, at 227-28. 
51. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1380 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994); see also Schacter, supra note 6, at 600-02 (discussing legal process theory).
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it.”52 Courts should interpret statutes by deciding what purpose
ought to be attributed to the legislation and then ascertaining which
interpretation will best carry out that purpose, provided that the
court does not give the words “a meaning they will not bear” or
violate other well-established public policies.53 When attributing
purposes to a statute, courts should “assume, unless the contrary
unmistakably appears, that the legislature was made up of reason-
able persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.”54 Hart and
Sacks emphasized that “[w]hat is crucial here is the realization that
law is being made, and that law is not supposed to be irrational.”55
Legal process theory held sway during an era that was character-
ized by unusual societal consensus56 and great optimism regarding
government’s capacity to solve social problems through the use of
neutral expertise.57 When this societal consensus collapsed and
public policy was viewed as a battle between competing interest
groups, it no longer made sense to assume that legislators were
“reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably,”58 or
to entrust the unelected judiciary with significant policy-making
discretion.59 Because there was little doubt that purposivism
provided the judiciary with at least as much policy-making discre-
tion as intentionalism, this theory of statutory interpretation began
to receive sharp criticism as undemocratic beginning in the late
1960s and 1970s.
52. HART & SACKS, supra note 51, at 1374. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 1378.
55. Id. at 1379. 
56. This is not to say unanimity. Indeed, the exclusion of certain social groups from public
life during this period resulted in much of the social unrest of the following decades. 
57. See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1039, 1056-59 (1997); Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law,
44 ADMIN. L. REV. 567, 574-75 (1992).
58. HART & SACKS, supra note 51, at 1378.
59. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 480 (2003) (“Post-Bickel, scholars began to
distrust not only judicial use of individual rights to invalidate popularly enacted statutes, but
any policy decision made by unelected officials.”); Jonathan T. Molot, Ambivalence About
Formalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1, 2, 8-12 (2007) (identifying efforts to “minimize judicial intrusions
into the political process” in different areas of public law in response to the “core problem” of
justifying judicial authority in “a post-realist age ... when judging is understood to be an
active, creative enterprise”).
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A group of judges, scholars, and other public officials on the
political right responded to the perceived shortcomings of legal
process theory and purposivism by returning to faithful agent
theory with a vengeance. These theorists advocate what William
Eskridge promptly dubbed “the new textualism”60 as an alternative
to an intentionalist methodology of statutory interpretation. The
new textualism posits that the only legitimate goal of statutory
interpretation is to ascertain the “plain meaning” of the text to an
ordinary speaker of English when the statute was enacted.61 The
advocates of this approach have severely criticized the judiciary’s
use of legislative history to determine what Congress sought to
achieve when it enacted a statute.62 New textualists maintain that
courts should rely instead on textual sources of meaning, including
the ordinary understanding of relevant statutory provisions, related
parts of the same act and the whole code, and long-standing canons
of statutory interpretation, to determine what elected officials who
participated in the lawmaking process formally agreed “to say.”63 A
statute’s underlying purpose and its policy consequences in a
particular case may be considered under this approach only to
resolve ambiguity, which exists only when a court is required to
choose from among two or more linguistically permissible meanings
that remain after a thorough examination of the statute’s “semantic
context.”64
The “intent skepticism” that underlies the new textualism is
based in part on the collective action problems facing an ongoing
multimember institution that were recognized by the legal realists.
New textualists have also relied, however, upon more recent lessons
about the legislative process from political science to underscore the
difficulties of attributing a meaningful intent to Congress beyond
what is reflected by “the clear social meaning of the enacted text.”65
60. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623-24 (1990). 
61. See Glen Staszewski, Textualism and the Executive Branch, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV.
143, 147-51 (describing the new textualism in statutory interpretation). 
62. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 29-37 (1997).
63. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 44, at 235-36 (describing the sources of guidance used
by textualists).
64. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 70, 91-92 (2006). 
65. See Manning, supra note 15, at 2408.
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The upshot is that because “the precise lines drawn by any statute
may reflect unrecorded compromises among interest groups, un-
knowable strategic behavior, or even an implicit legislative decision
to forgo costly bargaining over greater textual precision,” new
textualists maintain that a faithful agent should enforce the precise
terms of the deal enacted by Congress.66 New textualists also claim
that the judiciary’s obligation to serve as a faithful agent of
Congress and treat “the clear social meaning of the enacted text” as
dispositive for purposes of statutory interpretation is compelled by
the Constitution.67 For example, they rely upon the requirements of
bicameralism and presentment to point out that only the statutory
text, which was formally approved by both chambers of Congress
and the President, is authoritative.68 Similarly, textualists rely upon
judicial independence and the separation of legislative and judicial
functions contemplated by the Constitution to challenge the legit-
imacy of exercises of judicial discretion that deviate from plain
statutory meaning.69
The new textualism has been tremendously influential, but it
has not solved the countermajoritarian difficulty in statutory
interpre-tation. First, the theory is based on highly controversial
understandings of the legislative process and the constitutional
structure, and there are other well-developed ways of thinking
about these matters that would have very different implications for
statutory interpretation.70 The adoption of a textualist methodology
of statutory interpretation is therefore a discretionary policy choice
of enormous magnitude. Second, textualism cannot eliminate the
ambiguities in language and limitations on legislative foresight that
necessitate the judiciary’s exercise of policy-making discretion in
statutory interpretation. In some cases, precluding courts from
considering legislative history or policy consequences will, in fact,
greatly exacerbate these problems.71 To the extent that textualists
66. See id. at 2390.
67. See id. at 2408, 2431-45; Manning, supra note 5, at 56-78. 
68. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpre-
tation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 62, 68-69 (1994). 
69. See Manning, supra note 5, at 56-70.
70. See, e.g., Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001 (2006). 
71. For empirical studies suggesting that the use of legislative history can ameliorate
ideological decision making by the Justices, see James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal
Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29
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view the resolution of genuine statutory ambiguities as an inherent
part of the judiciary’s delegated authority to interpret statutes,72
this justification for the exercise of the requisite judicial discretion
is tautological.73 One could just as easily understand the combina-
tion of Article III’s judicial power and gaps in legislation as
delegations of authority to courts to ascertain Congress’s intent or
determine how best to achieve a statute’s underlying purposes in
particular cases.74 Because textualism is neither legally required nor
capable of eliminating judicial discretion, courts tend to avoid the
theory’s more extreme and normatively unattractive consequences,75
but the accompanying debates have merely highlighted the
continued need to square the judiciary’s authority over statutory
interpretation with principles of democracy.
While judges and scholars on the right have responded to the
shortcomings of intentionalism and purposivism by advocating the
new textualism, their counterparts on the left have increasingly
discarded faithful agent theories of statutory interpretation in favor
of “cooperative partner” models. For example, Ronald Dworkin has
argued that courts should promote the integrity of the entire legal
system by resolving interpretive disputes in the manner that follows
from “the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process
that provide the best constructive interpretation of the community’s
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117 (2008); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The
Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1093, 1135-36, 1194-95 (2008).
72. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA.
L. REV. 1, 3, 6 (2004). 
73. See CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 92.
74. Indeed, there is recent evidence to suggest that legislatures tend to prefer such
understandings. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from
the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part
I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013) (reporting the results of surveys of the attitudes of
congressional staffers toward statutory interpretation); Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the
Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341 (2010) (reporting the results of a survey of
the codified rules of statutory interpretation adopted by state legislatures).
75. See Molot, supra note 16, at 43 (claiming that a moderate version of textualism
currently prevails in federal court and that “any effort to accentuate the differences between
adherents and nonadherents of textualism will undermine its appeal”); cf. Abbe R. Gluck, The
States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New
Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1829-46 (2010) (describing a relatively moderate
approach to textualism that currently prevails in several states). 
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legal practice.”76 Guido Calabresi has argued that courts should be
willing to overrule statutes that no longer have contemporary
majority support when circumstances have materially changed
since the time of a law’s enactment.77 William Eskridge has argued
that courts should place significant emphasis on “evolutive con-
siderations” when they resolve statutory ambiguities and that
contemporary legal and social developments will properly supple-
ment and occasionally override originalist sources of statutory
meaning.78 Cass Sunstein has argued that courts should resolve
ambiguities in regulatory statutes by adopting background norms,
which reflect sound understandings of constitutional values and
contemporary institutional arrangements and are designed to
improve the operation of the modern administrative state.79 These
scholars are heirs to the legal process tradition with an increased
sensitivity to the scope of interpretive indeterminacy and the policy
discretion inherent in judicial decision making; the importance of
changed circumstances and the difficulty of formally amending
statutes; the pervasive flaws and potential inequities in the
operation of pluralist democracy; and the potential significance of
the establishment of the regulatory state. They recognize the limits
of static inquiries into original statutory meaning, and they embrace
the necessity and the potential desirability of a creative judicial role
in statutory interpretation.
Precisely because these theories embrace a creative judicial role
in statutory interpretation, they have been widely criticized on the
grounds that they are countermajoritarian or undemocratic and that
they exceed the scope of the judiciary’s competence to resolve dis-
putes over statutory meaning.80 Of course, each of the foregoing
scholars anticipated and responded to these concerns by providing
alternative accounts of democratic legitimacy in statutory interpre-
tation and discussing the judiciary’s potential capacity to improve the
operation of democracy. In short, these scholars rely on fundamental
76. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 225 (quoted in Eskridge, supra note 10, at 1550). 
77. CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 2.
78. Eskridge, supra note 10, at 1479, 1496. 
79. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 411-12. 
80. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 41, at 83 (“Allowing laws to be rewritten by
judges is a radical departure from our democratic system.”); Bressman, supra note 59, at 465-
66; Molot, supra note 59, at 8-9.
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notions of political morality,81 analogies to the judiciary’s authority
to make common law decisions,82 or countermajoritarian features of
the constitutional structure83 to argue that the judiciary’s role in
statutory interpretation is well designed to promote the rule of law
and the goals of a representative, constitutional democracy.84 Yet,
neither their responses nor the subsequent efforts of like-minded
scholars85 have successfully overcome the stigma that such judicial
policy making is undemocratic or provided a definitive solution to
the countermajoritarian difficulty in statutory interpretation.
Professor Eskridge has persuasively argued that the “theoretical
impasse” between advocates of faithful agent theory and cooperative
partner models is a result of the inability of either approach to
provide clear limits on judicial discretion based solely on the idea of
legislative supremacy that underlies the traditional model and the
related “inability of philosophical ‘liberalism’ to provide a satis-
factory theory of judging.”86 He explains that liberal theory posits
a collection of autonomous individuals with incommensurable
interests who enter into a social contract to achieve collective goals
that could not be reached solely through private action.87 Those
individuals like to preserve their autonomy, however, and they
generally prefer to protect the private sphere from interference by
the state.88 The agreed-upon mechanism for making collective
decisions on behalf of society is the legislature, which is politically
accountable to the people through regular elections.89 Because
federal judges are not politically accountable, their exercise of
policy-making discretion is in severe tension with liberal democratic
theory.90 Accordingly, liberal democratic theory seeks to limit the
81. See DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 387-92. 
82. See CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 93-100; Eskridge, supra note 10, at 1499-1500. 
83. See Eskridge, supra note 10, at 1498-1501, 1527-29; Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups
in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 43-44, 47 (1985); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 285-97 (1994). 
84. See Zeppos, supra note 14, at 379-85 (summarizing and critiquing Calabresi’s and
Eskridge’s theories of democratic legitimacy). 
85. See, e.g., Molot, supra note 11. 
86. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 344-45
(1989). 
87. Id. at 344.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 344-45.
90. See id. at 345.
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policy-making discretion of judges by requiring them to justify their
legal decisions as the product of the policy choices of elected
officials.91 Eskridge concludes that “it is doubtful that any theory
will successfully allay liberalism’s anxiety about permitting unelect-
ed judges to make policy choices that invade private interests,” and
recognizes that the potential responses to this dilemma include
abandoning liberalism in favor of some version of republican theory
or thinking about statutory interpretation in a significantly
different way.92
The remainder of this Article seeks to break this theoretical
impasse by providing a democratic defense of judicial discretion in
statutory interpretation that simultaneously relies on recent
advances in republican theory and proposes a significantly different
way of thinking about statutory interpretation. The counter-
majoritarian difficulty in statutory interpretation is ripe for
reconsideration at this time precisely because recent advances in
democratic theory, which have not previously been explored in the
literature, shed new light on this problem. Moreover, the rise of the
modern regulatory state provides a crucial backdrop for fundamen-
tally reconsidering the nature of statutory interpretation by the
judiciary. These recent advances in democratic theory and the
operation of the modern regulatory state work together to suggest
that statutory interpretation is best understood as a mechanism of
contestatory democracy. As such, the judiciary’s role in this
enterprise affirmatively promotes democracy by limiting the
government’s capacity to engage in arbitrary domination. The
remainder of this Article describes the recent innovations in
democratic theory, argues that statutory interpretation by the
judiciary in the modern regulatory state is best understood as a
form of contestatory democracy, relates this theory to current
practice, and discusses the most important implications of thinking
about statutory interpretation in this fashion.
91. See id.
92. Id.
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II. LIBERTY AS NON-DOMINATION AND THE TWO DIMENSIONS OF
DEMOCRACY
This Part lays the groundwork for my proposed solution to the
countermajoritarian difficulty in statutory interpretation by describ-
ing recent literature on civic republican theory, which provides an
alternative conception of liberty and identifies the two essential
dimensions of democracy. I rely primarily on the work of Philip
Pettit, which is set forth in his instant classic, Republicanism: A
Theory of Freedom and Government, and a series of related publica-
tions.93 It is noteworthy, however, that Pettit’s work is part of a
broader revival in civic republican theory over the past thirty
years.94 The “republican revival” is also closely related to the
development of deliberative democratic theory, which has become
“the ‘most active’ area of political theory” in recent years.95
Nonetheless, Pettit’s insights have never been used to explore the
democratic legitimacy of the judiciary’s role in statutory interpreta-
tion, despite their remarkable explanatory power. I begin by
describing the idea of liberty as non-domination, and proceed to
explain that a system of government can promote this vision of
freedom only if it includes mechanisms of electoral democracy, as
well as mechanisms of contestatory democratization.
93. See supra notes 18-19; see also Philip Pettit, Deliberative Democracy and the
Discursive Dilemma, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 268 (2001); Philip Pettit, Democracy, Electoral and
Contestatory, in DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 105 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo
eds., 2000); Philip Pettit, Depoliticizing Democracy, 17 RATIO JURIS. 52 (2004). 
94. See, e.g., Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Mark
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1511 (1992); Sunstein, supra note 83.
95. Dennis F. Thompson, Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science,
11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 497, 498 (2008) (quoting John S. Dryzek, Theory, Evidence, and the
Tasks of Deliberation, in DELIBERATION, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY: CAN THE PEOPLE
GOVERN? 237 (Shawn W. Rosenberg ed., 2007)). For some leading works, see Joshua Cohen,
Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
STATE 17 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 1989); DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster ed.,
1998); JOHN S. DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND: LIBERALS, CRITICS,
CONTESTATIONS (2000); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT
(1996); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? (2004); HENRY
S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT THE ENDS OF POLICY
(2002); Bernard Manin, On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, 15 POL. THEORY 338 (1987). 
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One of the key questions animating Pettit’s research is whether
democracy promotes freedom. He explains that a standard rationale
for government is that it reduces violations of freedom by private
parties, but he recognizes that the government can also be a source
of infringements upon liberty. Even if government were to promote
the overall freedom of society by preventing more infringements of
liberty than the state commits, Pettit wants to know “whether a
democratized state, just in virtue of being democratized, will itself
represent a lesser assault—or perhaps even no assault at all—on
the liberty of its citizens.”96 He claims that the answer to this
question depends on one’s understanding of liberty, and he
distinguishes between the modern liberal idea of freedom as non-
interference and the classical republican understanding of freedom
as non-domination.97
Under the liberal view of freedom as non-interference, an individ-
ual’s liberty is constrained by any intentional form of obstruction or
coercion.98 This means that a benign dictator who voluntarily
chooses not to interfere with the preferred actions of her subjects
would not be infringing upon their liberty. Moreover, all coercive
law or regulatory legislation infringes upon liberty as non-interfer-
ence, irrespective of whether it promotes the common good or
constitutes arbitrary governmental action. Accordingly, Pettit
concludes that if we think of freedom as non-interference, then the
adoption of a democratic form of government does nothing to reduce
infringements upon liberty by the state. Rather, there remains an
“essential enmity” between “coercive law or government, on the one
hand, and individual freedom on the other.”99
In contrast, the republican understanding of freedom as non-
domination focuses on the absence of the capacity for arbitrary
96. Pettit, supra note 19, at 163. 
97. PETTIT, supra note 18, at 17-79; see also Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets
Domination: Due Process of Administrative Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117, 128 (2011)
(recognizing the importance of Pettit’s contribution to the literature and analyzing the
nondelegation problem in administrative law from the perspective of freedom as
nondomination); Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination Model and the Judicial Oversight of
Democracy, 96 GEO. L.J. 1411 (2008) (applying Pettit’s “antidomination model” to the problem
of partisan gerrymandering).
98. Pettit, supra note 19, at 168-70.
99. Id. at 170. 
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interference by others.100 Arbitrary interference occurs whenever
power is exercised over someone’s life “without regard to their
perceived interests,”101 and the capacity to exercise such power
effectively creates a master-slave or master-subject relationship
where one person is at the mercy of others.102 Because a benign
dictator has the capacity to interfere with her subjects on an
arbitrary basis, the freedom of her subjects is necessarily compro-
mised from this perspective, even if such power remains dormant:
“the slave is a slave, and therefore someone unfree, no matter how
gentle the yoke.”103 On the other hand, coercive law or regulatory
legislation does not necessarily undermine freedom from this
perspective, provided that public officials take the common per-
ceived interests of their constituents into account when making
decisions. “So far as law and government can be made non-arbitrary
in character, to that extent they will not constitute a form of
domination and will not represent a compromise of republican
freedom.”104 Pettit therefore ultimately concludes that democracy
will necessarily promote freedom “if it can increase the non-
arbitrariness of legislation, adjudication, and administration.”105
Pettit points out that limiting arbitrary governmental action
requires mechanisms to prevent public officials from ignoring the
interests and perspectives of ordinary people, and that this supports
the electoral dimension of democracy.106 Periodic elections bring
government under the control of the people in the sense that voters
are empowered to select candidates for public office based on their
likelihood of promoting the collective interests of the people. The
republican argument for elections is simply that they provide a
sensible way to force the government to advance the common,
perceived interests of citizens, and thereby provide a check against
arbitrary domination by the state. Representatives are unlikely to
be reelected if they ignore the collective interests of the people.107 
100. Id. at 170-72. 
101. Id. at 165.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 167.
104. Id. at 171.
105. Id. at 170.
106. See id. at 173 (“The need for government to be forced to track the common, perceived
interests of citizens argues for an electoral form of democratization.”). 
107. See id.
2013] STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 243
Pettit recognizes, however, that elections can provide only a
limited protection against the possibility of arbitrary domination
because electoral democracy is not necessarily responsive to the
interests and perspectives of minorities.108 Indeed, “it is quite con-
sistent with electoral democracy that government should only track
the perceived interests of a majority, absolute or relative, on any
issue and that it should have a dominating aspect from the point of
view of others.”109 For this reason, republican theorists have always
been concerned about providing structural safeguards to prevent the
tyranny of the majority.110 “The elimination of domination would
require, not just that the people considered collectively cannot be
ignored by government, but also that people considered severally or
distributively cannot be ignored either.”111
Pettit therefore considers “whether there is any way of subjecting
government to a mode of distributive or minority control in order to
balance the electorally established mode of collective or majority
control.”112 The most obvious solution113 is a procedure that would
enable minorities to question public decisions on the basis of their
own perceived interests and to trigger a review in an impartial
forum where all “relevant interests are taken equally into account
and only impartially supported decisions are upheld.”114 A con-
testatory regime of this nature provides citizens with the power to
challenge public decisions on the grounds that their interests or
perspectives were not adequately taken into account during the
decision-making process, and the resulting decisions were therefore
arbitrary.115 The underlying assumption is that the final decision
would have been different if such interests were given equal
consideration.
Pettit recognizes that functioning democracies already provide
several familiar avenues of contestation, including judicial review,
108. Id. at 173-78. 
109. Id. at 174. 
110. See, e.g., Joseph M. Bessette, Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in
Republican Government, in HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION? 102 (Robert A. Goldwin
& William A. Schambra eds., 1980); Sunstein, supra note 83, at 39-45. 
111. Pettit, supra note 19, at 178. 
112. Id.
113. Id. at 179.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 180.
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as well as the ability to challenge public decisions on various
grounds within legislative or administrative bodies.116 These mech-
anisms for democratic contestation tend to be specifically designed
to ensure that the interests and perspectives of complainants are
adequately considered, even if the public officials who made the
challenged decision had the opportunity or incentive to ignore
competing points of view. Contestatory proceedings of this nature
frequently provide opportunities to invalidate arbitrary governmen-
tal action, but they also promote freedom as non-domination to the
extent that the “losers” in such proceedings could reasonably be
expected to accept the results of the process as legitimate because
their interests and perspectives were given equal consideration.117
Pettit claims that the oppositional ideal of contestatory democracy
has an impressive historical pedigree, and that it continues to be
recognized as an essential feature of contemporary democracies.118
Nonetheless, he acknowledges that the idea of contestatory dem-
ocracy has been overshadowed by the idea of placing government
under popular control, and that the latter idea has come to define
the term democracy in popular parlance.119 Pettit regards this as an
unfortunate development, and he argues that since “[s]ensible
political theorists all agree that popular, collective control needs to
be restricted in various ways,” they should also recognize that such
limitations affirmatively promote democracy, “under the only inter-
pretation that properly connects democracy with the requirements
of individual freedom.”120
At the end of the day, Pettit explains that electoral democracy
promotes legitimacy because it ensures that governmental decisions
can be traced indirectly to the “collective will of the people.”121
Contestatory democracy further enhances the democratic legitimacy
116. Id. at 184-85.
117. There is empirical support for the proposition that fair procedures can enhance
perceptions of legitimacy. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006). 
118. Pettit, supra note 19, at 183-88.
119. Id. at 184-85.
120. Id.; see also Stephen Macedo, Against Majoritarianism: Democratic Values and
Institutional Design, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1030 (2010) (claiming that “we should stop talking
about ‘majoritarianism’ as a plausible characterization of a political system that we would
recommend,” and that “legitimate democracies are those that respect minority rights and
promote fair and inclusive deliberation”). 
121. Pettit, supra note 19, at 180. 
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of those decisions to the extent they can withstand challenges
brought by adversely affected individuals or groups “in forums and
under procedures that are acceptable to all concerned.”122 Electoral
democracy “gives the collective people an indirect power of author-
ship over the laws,”123 whereas contestatory democracy gives “the
people, considered individually, a limited and, of course, indirect
power of editorship over those laws.”124 The remainder of this Article
argues that statutory interpretation in the modern regulatory state
is best understood as a form of contestatory democracy.
III. CONCEPTUALIZING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AS
CONTESTATORY DEMOCRACY
Consider the questions presented in some of the most well-known
statutory interpretation cases of the past two decades. In MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T, the Supreme Court examined
whether the Communications Act of 1934, which authorizes the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to “modify any
requirement” of the relevant section of the Act, permitted the
agency to make the tariff-filing requirement of the Act optional for
telephone companies lacking market power.125 The lawsuit was
initiated by AT&T, the only company still required to comply with
the Act’s tariff-filing requirement under the agency’s interpreta-
tion.126 The plaintiff alleged that the FCC’s de-tariffing policy
exceeded the scope of its statutory authority and was therefore
unlawful. Though a majority of the Court resolved the case based on
its understanding of the dictionary definition of the word
“modify,”127 the lawsuit ultimately provided AT&T with a successful
opportunity to contest the validity of the FCC’s de-tariffing policy
under the Communications Act. Similarly, in Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon, the Court considered
the question of whether a regulation promulgated by the Secretary
of the Interior, which defined the term “harm” under the Endan-
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. 
125. 512 U.S. 218 (1994); see Brief for Petitioner at 2, MCI, 512 U.S. 218 (No. 93-356).
126. See MCI, 512 U.S. at 231.
127. Id. at 234.
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gered Species Act to include “significant habitat modification or
degradation” that “actually kills or injures wildlife,” exceeded the
scope of the Secretary’s statutory authority and was therefore
invalid on its face.128 The lawsuit was brought by small landowners,
logging companies, and families who were dependent on the logging
industry, which was allegedly being hampered by the agency’s
regulation.129 More recently, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Co., the Court decided whether tobacco products are subject to
regulation as “drugs” or “devices” under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, which authorizes the Food and Drug Administration
to regulate products that are “intended to affect the structure or any
function of the body.”130 Several tobacco companies initiated the
lawsuit to challenge the legality of FDA rules that regulated the
marketing and sale of tobacco products to minors.131
These cases are not at all unusual. In a recent empirical investi-
gation of the Supreme Court’s application of its deference doctrine,
William Eskridge and Lauren Baer identified 1014 cases decided
between 1983 and 2005 in which a federal agency interpretation of
a statute was at issue.132 Many of these cases involved challenges to
the legality of decisions by federal agencies.133 These cases are
almost certainly a drop in the bucket, considering that most
challenges to the legality of agency action are litigated in lower
courts, and the vast majority of those cases are not reviewed by the
Supreme Court.134 I am therefore writing against a contemporary
backdrop in which most issues of statutory interpretation in federal
courts arise in the context of challenges to the validity of adminis-
trative action. One party is asserting that an agency has exceeded
the scope of its statutory authority, while the agency is claiming
that the manner in which it has chosen to implement its statutory
128. 515 U.S. 687, 690 (1995); see Brief for Petitioner at 2, Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687 (No.
94-859). 
129. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 692. 
130. 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000); see Brief for Petitioner at 2, Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S.
120 (No. 98-1152).
131. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 129.
132. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 71, at 1094. 
133. See id. at 1213 (coding decisions for whether they were decided in favor or against an
agency’s interpretation, or if the Court issued a “mixed decision”). 
134. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1093, 1095 (1987). 
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authority is legally permissible and reasonable as a policy matter.
The federal judiciary is resolving a “contest” over the permissible
scope of governmental authority when it decides such a case or
controversy. My contention is simply that statutory interpretation
in the modern regulatory state is typically a species of judicial
review of agency action and a prototypical example of a mechanism
for contestatory democracy. Accordingly, statutory interpretation
has the capacity to promote freedom as non-domination, and
thereby affirmatively to improve the democratic legitimacy of
particular exercises of governmental authority. And, contrary to the
premises of the countermajoritarian difficulty, this is especially true
when Congress has not explicitly resolved the precise question at
issue, and administrators or judges must therefore exercise policy-
making discretion.
Although my primary focus is the judiciary’s interpretation of
federal regulatory statutes that are implemented by administrative
agencies, this conception of statutory interpretation could also be
applied in other contexts.135 For example, the judiciary’s interpreta-
tion of criminal statutes is also best understood as a mechanism for
contestatory democracy. Thus, in Holy Trinity Church v. United
States, the Court resolved a contest over whether the government
could impose a fine on a church for hiring a rector from England “to
perform labor or service of any kind” in alleged violation of a federal
statute.136 The Court agreed with the plaintiff’s contention that the
statute was inapplicable to such “brain toilers,” and famously
observed that “[i]t is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not
within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.”137 This
conception of statutory interpretation could even be applied to many
civil cases between private parties in which the plaintiff is asserting
a private right of action created by a federal statute. For example,
in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, the Court essentially
135. Even if this were not the case, Edward Rubin has pointed out that “it could readily be
argued that courts in an administrative era should adopt, as their general standard for all
cases, the approach to interpretation that fits administrative cases.” Edward Rubin, Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, no. 2,
2002, at 10. 
136. 143 U.S. 457, 458 (1892).
137. Id. at 459. 
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resolved a contest regarding whether private employers could be
prohibited from adopting voluntary affirmative action plans under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.138 Indeed, most of the cases
that I teach in my Legislation course are very good examples of
statutory interpretation as contestatory democracy.139
It is one thing, of course, to recognize that statutory interpretation
in the modern regulatory state is best understood as a mechanism
of contestatory democracy.140 It is another thing to understand
138. 443 U.S. 193, 194 (1979). 
139. In addition to cases discussed elsewhere in this Article, challenges to federal agency
action include Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of Education, 550 U.S. 81
(2007) (whether the Department of Education’s method of calculating per-pupil expenditures
violated the Impact Aid Act); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (whether the
Army Corps of Engineers could lawfully enforce the provisions of the Clean Water Act against
the owners of certain wetlands); United States v. Mead, 553 U.S. 218 (2001) (whether day
planners were “bound diaries” that could be subject to a duty by the Customs Service); Public
Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989) (whether the open meeting
requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act apply to the Standing Committee on the
Judiciary of the American Bar Association); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490
(1979) (whether the NLRB could exercise jurisdiction over teachers in church-operated
schools); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (whether a $100 million project of the Tennessee
Valley Authority that was funded by Congress must be enjoined to protect the snail darter
under the Endangered Species Act); and Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (whether an
employment preference for qualified Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs violated the anti-
discrimination provisions of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972). The criminal
cases include Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998) (whether a defendant who
possesses a weapon in a locked glove compartment or trunk of a car “carries a firearm,” and
is thereby eligible for a mandatory five-year sentence enhancement); and United States v.
Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Chapman v. United States,
500 U.S. 453 (1991) (whether the weight of carriers should be counted for purposes of
sentencing defendants convicted of selling LSD). For other good examples, see Chisom v.
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) (whether the protections against minority vote dilution that are
provided by section 2 of the Voting Rights Act applied to judicial elections); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (whether appointed state judges are protected from age
discrimination by state and local governments under the ADEA); Kosak v. United States, 465
U.S. 848 (1984) (whether plaintiff could bring suit against the Customs Service for the
negligent destruction of his property under the Federal Torts Claim Act); Cartledge v. Miller,
457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (whether the anti-assignment or alienation provisions of
ERISA preclude the execution of validly issued court orders enforcing family support rights);
In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995) (whether the cohabiting boyfriend or lesbian partner
of a biological mother could lawfully adopt her child); and State v. 1979 Pontiac Trans Am, 487
A.2d 722 (N.J. 1985) (whether the state could permanently confiscate property that was used
to commit a crime from innocent owners who could prove that they were uninvolved in and
unaware of the wrongful activity, and that they had done all that reasonably could be
expected to prevent the proscribed use of their property). 
140. For a rare example of an article that recognizes that statutory interpretation can play
a contestatory role, see Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in Statutory
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precisely what this means for Congress, agencies, and courts.
Accordingly, the remainder of this Part outlines the respective roles
of legislatures, agencies, and courts when statutory interpretation
is understood as a form of contestatory democracy. 
A. The Authorial Role of an Elected Legislature
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to play the primary
authorial role in the lawmaking process,141 and this is entirely
legitimate because of the electoral dimension of democracy.142 It
follows that when Congress has explicitly resolved a policy question
in a reasoned fashion, agencies and courts are obligated to respect
the legislature’s decision. Republican theory therefore embraces a
sensible version of legislative supremacy that is consistent with the
constitutional structure and the Bill of Rights, and it nowhere
suggests that agencies or courts are authorized to make law in an
unconstrained fashion. Nonetheless, if democracy also includes a
contestatory dimension to protect the people from arbitrary
domination, this aspect of democracy will have important implica-
tions for our understanding of the role of elected representatives in
the lawmaking process. The resulting understanding of the
legislative process will, in turn, have important implications for the
proper roles of agencies and courts in statutory interpretation.
A fundamental prerequisite to the proper functioning of
contestatory democracy is that rather than adhering to a pluralistic
conception of the lawmaking process whereby legislation is under-
stood to reflect the prepolitical preferences of the majority or the
product of self-interested bargaining, the policy decisions of a
republican legislature should be the product of reasoned delibera-
tion.143 This is partly the case because self-interested bargaining is
unduly likely to favor the positions of the most powerful in society
and could therefore potentially result in arbitrary domination.
Moreover, legislation cannot truly be characterized as a collective
Construction, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 47, 49-53 (2010). 
141. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.”). 
142. See supra notes 19-22, 26, 106 and accompanying text.
143. See PETTIT, supra note 18, at 186-90, 202-05. 
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decision of the people if the interests and perspectives of minorities
are not considered.144 Contestatory democracy presumes that
individuals or groups will be able to challenge public decisions on
the grounds that their perceived interests were not taken into ac-
count during the lawmaking process, and that the final decision would
have been different if their views were given equal consideration.
The legislature must therefore engage in reasoned deliberation
about the means and ends of its policy decisions to provide a basis
for subsequent contestation. Such challenges would be incoherent
if the legislative process were merely designed to aggregate the
prepolitical preferences of elected representatives or their constitu-
ents. Accordingly, theories of contestatory democracy necessarily
incorporate the basic tenets of deliberative democratic theory at the
operational level.
Deliberative democratic theory maintains, in turn, that public
officials are obligated to engage in reasoned deliberation on which
courses of action will promote the public good.145 They must consider
all of the relevant information and views that are expressed during
a decision making process, and they should give reasoned explana-
tions for their decisions that could reasonably be accepted by free
and equal citizens with fundamentally competing perspectives.146
Public decisions that are rendered pursuant to these criteria are
democratically legitimate because each interest and perspective is
treated with equal respect and arbitrary decision making is
prohibited.147 Meanwhile, these requirements increase the odds of
144. See, e.g., RICHARDSON, supra note 95, at 213; Cohen, supra note 95, at 22-23; Manin,
supra note 95, at 359-60; see also Thompson, supra note 95, at 502-04 (discussing deliberative
democracy’s focus on “the need for a collective decision in a state of disagreement”). 
145. See Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative
Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 857-58 (2012) (summarizing the basic tenets of deliberative
democratic theory).
146. See, e.g., GUTMANN & THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 95, at
52; Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 95, at
193-94. 
147. See Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1291
(2009); see id. at 1282-84 (discussing the capacity of reason-giving to promote the legitimacy
of governmental authority in a democracy); Thompson, supra note 95, at 502 (“[L]egitimacy
... prescribes the process by which ... collective decisions can be morally justified to those who
are bound by them. It is the key defining element of deliberative democracy.”) (internal
punctuation omitted). 
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reaching the best decision on the merits in light of the available
information and fundamental differences of opinion.148
The basic tenets of deliberative democratic theory are reflected in
the American constitutional structure and relevant provisions of the
Bill of Rights,149 which is not surprising considering that the
Framers were famously concerned about the problem of faction and
the potential tyranny of the majority.150 Thus, for example, the
Framers rejected direct democracy at the federal level in favor of
representative democracy, and they expected elected representa-
tives to engage in a process of reasoned deliberation from which the
common good would emerge.151 They also adopted the requirements
of bicameralism and presentment, which ensure that a bill cannot
become a law unless there is either majority support for the
measure in both chambers of Congress and executive approval or an
unusually high level of congressional demand for the proposed
legislation.152 While this supermajority requirement facilitates
bargaining and thereby prevents the domination of otherwise
vulnerable minorities,153 it also generates reasoned deliberation in
a broader effort to reach agreements on how to promote the public
good, which are responsive to their interests and perspectives.154
The Supreme Court has recognized that the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause “includes a freedom from all substantial
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints.”155 Similarly, the
Equal Protection Clause has long been understood to raise concerns
when statutory classifications impose burdens upon individuals or
deprive them of benefits without advancing the purposes of the
148. See James D. Fearon, Deliberation as Discussion, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra
note 95, at 44-45 (describing “six major reasons or arguments for discussing a matter before
reaching a decision on what to do”); Staszewski, supra note 145, at 887. 
149. See Bessette, supra note 110, at 102-04; Sunstein, supra note 83, at 31; see also
Staszewski, supra note 70, at 1018-22. 
150. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
151. See, e.g., id.
152. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
153. See Manning, supra note 5, at 74-78.
154. See Staszewski, supra note 70, at 1021.
155. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). For a detailed dis-
cussion of this aspect of the Court’s due process jurisprudence, see Peter J. Rubin, Square
Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of
Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 844-47 (2003). 
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legislation.156 These principles are reflected in the doctrinal re-
quirement that ordinary legislation must be rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose, which would be unintelligible
under a pluralistic conception of the legislative process.157
While the rational basis test underenforces the relevant constitu-
tional norms based on institutional concerns,158 the structural
safeguards that are provided by the Constitution to facilitate
reasoned deliberation and prevent faction help to explain the strong
presumption of constitutionality that the judiciary routinely
ascribes to legislation.159 If a law does not implicate any fundamen-
tal rights or suspect classifications, the judiciary presumes that
elected representatives engaged in reasoned deliberation during the
lawmaking process and that they had public-regarding justifica-
tions for their policy choices. This presumption holds if the judiciary
is capable of hypothesizing permissible goals that could possibly be
served by a statutory scheme, regardless of the contents of the
legislative record.
Setting aside the adequacy of this approach to judicial review for
the moment,160 the Constitution’s structural safeguards also pro-
vide the best explanation for the idea of legislative supremacy in
statutory interpretation: when Congress has explicitly resolved a
specific policy issue pursuant to a legislative process that requires
elected representatives to engage in reasoned deliberation and
consider the interests and perspectives of minorities, the legisla-
ture’s decision should ordinarily be respected by agencies and courts
when the statute is implemented.161 In this situation, the issue was
156. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF.
L. REV. 341, 342-56 (1949). 
157. See Sunstein, supra note 83, at 49; Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 156, at 350. 
158. See Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitu-
tional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1216-18 (1978). 
159. See Philip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative Government,
Direct Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 421, 444
(1998). 
160. See infra Part V.B (returning to this question).
161. Cf. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984). Undoubtedly, ascertaining whether Congress has explicitly resolved a specific policy
question in a reasoned fashion during the legislative process will sometimes be difficult. See
Merrill, supra note 57, at 1091 (claiming that the line between clarity and ambiguity under
Chevron “has a highly random aspect to it”); Molot, supra note 16, at 51 (same). If, however,
we acknowledge that no methodology of statutory interpretation can eliminate the need for
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already “contested” and legitimately resolved during the lawmaking
process, and subsequent changes to the selected policy should
ordinarily be adopted pursuant to a statutory amendment. If the
government’s efforts to implement the selected policy are contested
in court on statutory grounds, this challenge should therefore be
unsuccessful. By the same token, legal challenges to the govern-
ment’s departure from the selected policy should be significantly
more viable.162
The corollary to this view of legislative supremacy, however, is
that when Congress has not explicitly resolved a particular policy
question in a reasoned fashion during the legislative process, then
the best way to avoid the potential for arbitrary domination is for
the public officials who implement the law to engage in reasoned
decision making on the best course of action under the circum-
stances. In the modern regulatory state, the responsibility for
resolving these statutory ambiguities will ordinarily fall, as an
initial matter, on an administrative agency with delegated authority
to carry out the purposes of the federal programs established by
Congress.
B. The Intermediate Role of Agencies
Public officials who implement the law will necessarily have
substantial policy-making discretion if statutes are deemed “ambigu-
judgment in resolving hard cases, and we recognize that statutory interpretation should be
understood as a mechanism of contestatory democracy, then this should be a central aspect
of the inquiry even if the answer is sometimes debatable. From this perspective, moreover,
the legislative record should convey useful information about whether elected representatives
engaged in reasoned deliberation about a contested policy question, and whether the issue
was resolved in a reasoned fashion during the legislative process. See Bernard W. Bell,
Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The Public Justification Approach to Statutory
Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1999). Agencies and courts should also be capable of
distinguishing between the known imprecision of statutory rules and identifiable bargains or
compromises, which should ordinarily be respected when a law is implemented, and
unanticipated or unresolved problems, which agencies and courts should have more flexibility
to address in a reasoned fashion—even if those problems could, in theory, have been the
subject of speculative backroom deals. See Staszewski, supra note 70, at 1025-27 (explaining
the importance of these distinctions).
162. From this perspective, limitations on judicial review of agency inaction are
problematic because they preclude individuals and groups from contesting an agency’s failure
to implement its statutory mandate. See Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Commission,
59 EMORY L.J. 369, 370-71 (2009).
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ous” when Congress has not explicitly resolved an issue during the
legislative process or unanticipated problems arise. This is highly
problematic under the traditional model, which maintains that
unelected administrators and judges should serve as the legisla-
ture’s faithful agents and “carry out decisions they do not make.”163
The exercise of policy-making discretion by administrators and
judges is significantly less troubling, however, if the role of democ-
racy is to promote freedom as non-domination and there are
structural safeguards in place to guard against the possibility of
arbitrary domination by the state. The central function of adminis-
trative law is to provide such safeguards,164 which include the
opportunities for contestatory democracy that are provided by
judicial review of agency action and statutory interpretation by
federal courts in the modern regulatory state.
Before turning directly to those mechanisms of contestatory
democracy, it is worth considering how administrative agencies go
about implementing federal regulatory statutes in the first instance.
After all, those statutes are just words on paper in the absence of
administrative action, and final agency action is generally required
for an interpretive dispute to be justiciable in federal court.165 Jerry
Mashaw has therefore pointed out that “agencies are, by necessity,
the primary official interpreters of federal statutes.”166 Mashaw has
suggested, moreover, that there are good reasons to think that
agencies do not and should not perform this task in precisely the
same manner as courts.167 Professor Mashaw’s seminal work on this
topic has led to a lively debate on the question of whether it is
accurate to think of agency decision making as “interpretation” in
a conventional sense.168 For example, Elizabeth Foote has argued
163. See Easterbrook, supra note 43, at 60. 
164. See Bressman, supra note 59, at 472-73.
165. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (2006).
166. Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary
Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 502-03 (2005). 
167. See id. at 521-24. 
168. See also Glen Staszewski, Introduction to Symposium on Administrative Statutory
Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 1; Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the
Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of
Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 346-47 (1990). Compare Jerry L. Mashaw,
Agency-Centered or Court-Centered Administrative Law? A Dialogue with Richard Pierce on
Agency Statutory Interpretation, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 889 (2007), with Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
How Agencies Should Give Meaning to the Statutes They Administer: A Response to Mashaw
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that the primary role of agencies is not to interpret federal statutes,
but rather to implement or carry out federal programs on an ongoing
basis through a variety of policy-making vehicles.169 Although this
is an important and accurate observation, Mashaw has persuasively
explained that the implementation of statutes routinely requires
“interpretation” to ascertain the underlying purposes of the program
and what the agency should be doing.170
I am skeptical that one can draw a clear or coherent line between
the tasks of interpretation and implementation, but it seems clear
that (1) agencies are the primary “implementers” of federal statutes
in the modern regulatory state, (2) they do not make decisions in
precisely the same manner as courts, and (3) they are obligated to
carry out the ascertainable purposes of their programs in a reasoned
fashion. As explained below, I also believe that agencies perform an
“intermediate” lawmaking role that falls in between the authorial
role of the legislature and the editorial role of the judiciary. Perhaps
more accurately, I believe that agencies sometimes play an
authorial role, and they sometimes play an editorial role, depending
on the terms and specificity of their statutory mandates. Even when
agencies play an authorial role, however, they are still bound by the
underlying purposes of their statutory programs, and they should
therefore be understood as commissioned authors, who have agreed
to undertake a particular, instrumental project, subject only to the
most general of instructions.
There are several recurring situations in which agencies play
the role of a commissioned author. First, Congress frequently
provides explicit delegations of lawmaking authority to regulatory
agencies.171 For example, Congress may charge the Environmental
Protection Agency with responsibility for adopting limits on certain
and Strauss, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 197 (2007).
169. See Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How
Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673,
678-81 (2007). 
170. See Mashaw, supra note 168, at 897-98; Cf. City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct.
1863, 1865 (2013) (claiming that when agency action is challenged as contrary to law, the
question “is always whether the agency has gone beyond what Congress has permitted it to
do,” and therefore there is no basis for distinguishing between jurisdictional and nonjuris-
dictional interpretations of regulatory statutes). 
171. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial
and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 364 (2010). 
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types of pollution. The agency will then be the author of any
promulgated standards. Similarly, Congress often promulgates
statutes that cannot be enforced until an administrative agency
promulgates legislative rules of conduct.172 These statutes do not
directly regulate the public, but rather merely authorize regulatory
agencies to promulgate rules of conduct in a particular area.173
Agencies are therefore the authors of any applicable rules that are
subsequently adopted. Congress has also been known to enact
statutes that authorize agencies to promulgate rules or issue orders
pursuant to a general obligation to “promote the public interest” in
a particular field.174 Once again, agencies will necessarily be the
authors of policy decisions that are made in carrying out this
authority. The same is true whenever Congress leaves gaping holes
or patent ambiguity in the operative provisions of regulatory
statutes that set forth rules of conduct that could be enforced by
administrative agencies against the general public.175
There is nothing formally undemocratic about a regulatory agency
playing the role of a commissioned author because such authority
was by definition delegated from the elected legislature.176 More-
over, elected officials in the executive and legislative branches have
a variety of well-known means to influence how this delegated
authority is exercised.177 From a republican perspective, these
mechanisms of political influence or control are best understood as
the means by which the electoral dimension of democracy is applied
172. See, e.g., Highway Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-606, 84 Stat. 1713, 1739 (1970)
(codified as amended at scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (2006)) (establishing the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration and requiring it to promulgate vehicle safety
standards); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-99) (requiring the Food and Drug Administration
to promulgate regulations regarding food safety). 
173. See Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 369, 381-82 (1989) (describing the ubiquity of such statutes in the modern regulatory
state). 
174. See, e.g., Amendments to the Communications Act, ch. 296, 52 Stat. 588, 588 (1938)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 201(b)) (adding a general grant of authority to “prescribe
such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the
provisions of this Act”). 
175. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45 (authorizing the Federal Trade Commission to prevent “unfair
methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices”). 
176. See Rubin, supra note 135, at 6.
177. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 45-49, 84-98,
524-38 (5th ed. 2009) (discussing means of legislative and executive control or oversight). 
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to agency action. Recall that avoiding the possibility of arbitrary
domination by the state requires an arrangement that will prevent
the government from ignoring the common, perceived interests of
ordinary citizens. Although I am skeptical that presidential or
congressional elections actually turn on the policy decisions of
regulatory agencies,178 it does seem plausible that the political
influence of elected officials helps to ensure that agency decisions
can be said to originate, “however indirectly, in the collective will of
the people.”179 This is the case because the political influences on
regulatory decision making encourage agency officials to consider
the interests and perspectives of powerful members of the public or
their representatives. 
Like other mechanisms that promote the electoral dimension of
democracy, however, administrative decision making might “only
track the perceived interests of a majority, absolute or relative on
any issue,” and therefore “have a dominating aspect from the point
of view of others.”180 It is not surprising then that administrative
discretion has always been feared on the grounds that agencies
might adopt “tunnel vision” and ignore the legitimate concerns of
regulated entities,181 or that they could be captured by regulated
entities and ignore the interests and perspectives of the intended
beneficiaries of statutory programs.182 In truth, agencies routinely
walk a fine line between the perils of majority and minority faction.
Accordingly, it is vital for administrative law to provide mechanisms
of contestatory democracy to ensure that everyone’s views are given
equal consideration. An agency’s role as commissioned author is
therefore most legitimately exercised pursuant to deliberative
procedures, such as notice-and-comment rule making, and adminis-
trative policy decisions should ordinarily be subject to hard-look
judicial review to ensure that the agency has engaged in reasoned
decision making and thereby avoided the possibility of arbitrary
domination.183
178. See Staszewski, supra note 145, at 867-72; Staszewski, supra note 147, at 1271-76. 
179. See Pettit, supra note 19, at 180. 
180. See id. at 174. 
181. See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control
of Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 600 (2002).
182. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1667, 1712-13 (1975).
183. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
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The foregoing discussion involved situations in which Congress
has delegated broad lawmaking authority to an agency pursuant to
a relatively open-ended statutory mandate to regulate a field or
solve a problem. It is, of course, frequently the case that Congress
enacts more detailed statutes that explicitly resolve some matters,
while leaving other policy questions for resolution by the agency.
When an agency implements a federal program in this situation, it
must initially determine whether Congress has explicitly resolved
a particular question during the legislative process. If so, the agency
should respect Congress’s decision, unless the circumstances have
changed sufficiently to generate the functional equivalent of fresh
ambiguities. This is true for strategic reasons because an agency
presumably does not want its decisions to be invalidated during the
course of judicial review,184 but agency officials are also obligated by
their oaths of office to faithfully execute the law and therefore to
honor the principle of legislative supremacy.185 In this situation,
administrators and judges are, indeed, obligated to serve as faithful
agents of the legislature.
When an agency determines that a regulatory statute is ambigu-
ous, however, either because Congress did not explicitly resolve the
precise question at issue, or because the circumstances have
materially changed, the agency will play an editorial role when it
implements the statute. Accordingly, the agency will need to engage
in reasoned deliberation to determine the best way of implementing
the statute on the merits under the circumstances.
Regulatory agencies should generally approach statutes in a
manner that differs in some ways from courts—based on institu-
tional considerations—when they evaluate whether Congress
explicitly resolved a policy question during the legislative process
and consider whether or precisely how to edit the law.186 First,
agencies will frequently be in a better position than courts to
ascertain whether the text of a statute should be understood in an
(1983); see also Staszewski, supra note 145, at 892 (“[H]ard-look judicial review is perhaps the
prime example of a well-established legal doctrine that has firmly embraced and squarely
adopted the most fundamental principles of deliberative democratic theory.”). 
184. See Pierce, supra note 168, at 202-03. 
185. See Mashaw, supra note 168, at 901. 
186. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH.
L. REV. 885, 914-15 (2003); supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
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ordinary or technical fashion because of their greater familiarity
with the relevant area of law and actual involvement with the
legislative process that produced the text.187 Second, agencies will
generally be more adept at using legislative history in a reliable
fashion than courts based on the participation of agency officials in
the legislative process, the ongoing interactions among agency
officials and lawmakers, and the institutional memory of agency
staff regarding the history of the programs they are responsible for
carrying out.188 Third, an agency’s deep understanding of its organic
statutes and substantive areas of law will provide it with advan-
tages over courts in utilizing interpretive methods that pay special
attention to substantive background principles of law and under-
stand the meaning of statutes in light of such background princi-
ples.189 Fourth, agencies should be more adept at interpreting
regulatory statutes in a purposive fashion than courts because they
will have a better understanding of the underlying purposes of the
programs they are responsible for carrying out, and they should be
better able to assess how far the enacting Congress intended to go
to achieve those ends.190 An agency’s technical expertise will also
provide distinct advantages over courts in determining how
effectively a particular interpretation will carry out the statute’s
underlying purposes.191 If the enacting Congress failed to resolve
these issues in a sufficiently clear or detailed fashion, agencies will,
of course, also have a better sense of how far the current President
and Congress want the agency to press any particular policy
objective.192 Fifth, the technical expertise and political milieu of
administrative agencies virtually ensure that they will interpret
187. See Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional Competence in Statutory Inter-
pretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 89, 104 (discussing the advantages provided by an agency’s
involvement with the legislative process). 
188. See Strauss, supra note 168, at 346-48. 
189. See Jonathan R. Siegel, Guardians of the Background Principles, 2009 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 123, 124. For a general discussion of this method of statutory interpretation, see
Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV.
1023, 1066-67 (1998). 
190. See Herz, supra note 187, at 98, 103-05 (claiming that agencies have advantages over
the judiciary in identifying statutory purposes, but noting that agencies may also have greater
incentives to “overshoot[] the mark”). 
191. See id. at 99-101. 
192. See Rubin, supra note 135, at 6 (“[A]gencies, unlike courts, are under the supervision
of elected officials who can discipline their interpretive efforts.”). 
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statutes in a relatively dynamic fashion that places heavy emphasis
on contemporary considerations. Indeed, Edward Rubin has argued
that at least when agencies engage in legislative rule making and
enforcement, it is highly unlikely that they could employ any
approach other than dynamic statutory interpretation: “[t]he whole
point of granting an agency rule making authority is to enable it to
enact supplementary provisions that are applicable to the present
societal, political and legal context.”193 This insight, of course,
strongly suggests that Congress expects agencies to interpret
statutes dynamically, and that this is presumably what Congress
intends when it authorizes agencies to promulgate rules to carry out
the provisions of federal programs. Agencies should therefore have
a reasonable amount of flexibility to give ambiguous statutes
different meanings over time as circumstances change.194 Finally,
agencies should be more adept than courts at interpreting regula-
tory statutes in an equitable fashion that deviates from the plain
meaning of statutory language to avoid absurd results or other
highly problematic consequences. As Cass Sunstein has observed,
“[A]gencies are in a good position to know whether a particular
outcome is, in fact, absurd,” and they are “far better” situated than
courts to assess whether deviating from the statutory text to reach
sensible results in particular cases would pose significant problems
for administration of a program.195 
When the advantages of agencies are considered as a group, it
becomes apparent that they are better situated than courts to
ascertain whether Congress explicitly resolved an issue during the
legislative process, and to perform the editorial function that is
needed to implement the law in a reasoned fashion when statutes
are ambiguous or would otherwise lead to unanticipated problems.
It is therefore generally a good thing that agencies are “the primary
193. Id. at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
194. See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1279 (2008)
(claiming that there was already doctrinal support for the two steps of the Chevron
framework, but the decision “did spark a genuine revolution—by challenging the reigning
principles of certainty and finality in statutory interpretation”); Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco
a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1019 (1998)
(“[Administrative] agencies have become modern America’s common law courts ... [with the]
power to adapt statutory language to changing understandings and circumstances.”). 
195. Cass R. Sunstein, Avoiding Absurdity? A New Canon in Regulatory Law, 32 ENVTL.
L. REP. 11,126, 11,131 (2002). 
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official interpreters of federal statutes”196 in the modern regulatory
state from the standpoint of avoiding arbitrary domination.
Despite their advantages, it is undoubtedly true that administra-
tive agencies can abuse their discretion and potentially engage in
arbitrary domination when they perform their editorial function.
These dangers can, of course, be minimized if agencies perform their
editorial role through deliberative procedures that take advantage
of administrative expertise and allow interested members of the
public to provide relevant information and express their views on
the legality and desirability of an agency’s proposed course of action.
In other words, the potential for arbitrary domination can be
reduced if an agency’s decision-making process is “contestatory” in
nature.197 The notice-and-comment rule making procedures of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) are widely considered an
exemplar of deliberative procedures of this nature.198 Partly for this
reason, Kenneth Culp Davis famously referred to legislative rule
making under the APA as “one of the greatest inventions of modern
government.”199 Nonetheless, agencies do not always use notice-and-
comment rule making to interpret statutes, and other administra-
tive procedures comport to widely varying degrees with this model.
In addition to using sufficiently deliberative procedures, it is also
vital to ensure that agencies actually consider the relevant informa-
tion and competing views that are presented during the decision-
making process, and that agencies provide reasoned explanations
for their decisions that could reasonably be accepted by citizens with
fundamentally competing perspectives. An agency’s interpretive
decisions should therefore generally be subject to meaningful
judicial review, as explained in the following Section.
196. Mashaw, supra note 166, at 502-03.
197. See PETTIT, supra note 18, at 296 (explaining that “procedural and consultative
measures” during a decision-making process are “two of the three sides to a contestatory
democracy,” and that the third side is the opportunity for ex post review by an impartial
appellate body).
198. See Seidenfeld, supra note 94, at 1560; Sunstein, supra note 83, at 61-62. 
199. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.15, at 283 (Supp. 1970).
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C. The Editorial Role of the Judiciary
The preceding Sections explained that there are structural
safeguards in the legislative and administrative processes that
facilitate reasoned deliberation and encourage lawmakers to
consider the interests and perspectives of minorities. Nonetheless,
statutes and administrative action are both products of the electoral
dimension of democracy and could therefore easily result in majority
tyranny or minority faction. In either case, individuals or groups
would potentially be subject to arbitrary domination. It is therefore
important to provide other mechanisms of contestatory democracy
that could minimize this possibility by helping to ensure that
relevant interests are taken equally into account. As Philip Pettit
has explained, the most promising solution is a procedure that
would enable individuals or groups to call governmental decisions
into question, and to trigger a review in an impartial court of
appeal.200 The availability of such a procedure improves the
democratic legitimacy of decisions that are not challenged, because
the possibility of subsequent review encourages public officials to
engage in reasoned decision making in the first place.201 When
public decisions are formally challenged, however, the contestatory
mode of democracy gives “the people, considered individually, a
limited and, of course, indirect power of editorship over those
laws.”202 In considering how the judiciary should perform this
editorial role on behalf of the people, it is useful to distinguish
between cases or controversies in which the judiciary is (1) review-
ing the legality of agency law making, (2) interpreting a statute
without a responsible agency, and (3) interpreting a statute with
guidance from a regulatory agency. In each of these contexts, the
judiciary is typically resolving a contest over the permissible
200. See supra notes 24, 114 and accompanying text. 
201. See Pettit, supra note 19, at 180; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170,
1194-95 (1993) (recognizing that the availability of judicial review influences agency decision
making); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 653, 656, 666-67 (1985) (same). 
202. See Pettit, supra note 19, at 180.
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scope of governmental authority, and thereby promoting freedom as
nondomination.
1. Judicial Review of Agency Law Making
As explained above, administrative agencies are “the primary
official interpreters of federal statutes” in the modern regulatory
state.203 Moreover, when agencies are delegated lawmaking author-
ity, and they interpret statutes pursuant to deliberative lawmaking
procedures, they are performing a commissioned authorial role and
are therefore the authoritative decision makers. Nonetheless,
federal courts are typically authorized to review the validity of such
agency decisions, and it is in this context that my claim—that
statutory interpretation by the judiciary is best understood as a
mechanism of contestatory democracy—is most obvious.
I have also explained that Congress’s explicit resolution of a
policy question should ordinarily be respected by agencies and
courts when a statute is implemented because the legislature is
charged with the primary authorial role in the lawmaking
process.204 Challenges to the legality of agency action on statutory
grounds will therefore potentially turn on a judicial determination
that Congress has unambiguously resolved the precise question at
issue. Such judicial challenges will almost invariably be unsuccess-
ful if the agency’s decision comports with Congress’s resolution of
the question. Conversely, an agency’s decision will be invalidated as
contrary to law if it is incompatible with Congress’s resolution of the
matter. Although the foregoing propositions are true under any
conventional standard of judicial review, substantial disagreement
exists regarding the methods of statutory interpretation that courts
should use when they assess whether Congress has unambiguously
resolved a particular policy question.205 When statutory interpreta-
tion is understood as a mechanism of contestatory democracy, the
legislative history of a statute should play a prominent role in this
analysis because one should expect legislators to engage in reasoned
203. See Mashaw, supra note 166, at 502-03. 
204. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
205. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 71, at 1122-23 (“The clearest effect of Chevron ... is
that it has created an increasingly complicated set of doctrinal debates about when [Chevron]
deference [is applicable].”).
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deliberation during the lawmaking process.206 I have also pointed
out that agencies have significant institutional advantages over
courts that could help them better assess whether Congress has
explicitly resolved a policy question during the legislative process.207
The institutional advantages of agencies suggest that courts should
treat agency judgments regarding the unambiguous meaning of
statutes with respect during the process of judicial review.208
At the same time, the fact that a statute has a straightforward
semantic meaning should not necessarily compel the conclusion that
Congress unambiguously resolved the precise question at issue. On
the contrary, if the literal application of statutory language would
lead to unintended absurdities, administrative agencies should be
allowed to deviate from the statute’s ordinary meaning to reach
sensible results,209 thereby limiting the potential for arbitrary
domination by the state. For example, in American Water Works
Ass’n v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit upheld the agency’s decision to
implement the Safe Drinking Water Act by establishing a treatment
technique, rather than a maximum contaminant level, for regulat-
ing lead.210 The Act anticipated that the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) would typically establish “maximum contaminant
levels” for regulating chemicals, but expressly authorized the use of
“treatment techniques” when the agency determined that it was not
“economically or technologically feasible” to measure the level of a
particular contaminant.211 The EPA concluded that it was not
206. See supra Part III.A; see also Bell, supra note 161; Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and
the Congress: Should Judges Disdain Political History?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 242, 247 (1998).
207. See supra notes 186-95 and accompanying text.
208. I therefore tend to agree with Michael Herz’s suggestion that the judiciary should give
Skidmore deference to an agency’s resolution of questions of law under the first step of
Chevron. See Michael Herz, Judicial Review of Statutory Issues Outside of the Chevron
Doctrine, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 125, 142-43
(John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005). I am also sympathetic to Mark Seidenfeld’s recent
argument that “judges should liberally construe statutes as amenable to multiple
interpretations” under the first step of Chevron, albeit for somewhat different reasons. See
Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 303-05, 311 (2011)
(challenging the notion that Chevron deference is justified by Congress’s intent and claiming
that it “is better viewed as a doctrine of judicial self-restraint under the courts’ Article III
responsibilities”). 
209. See Sunstein, supra note 195, at 11,126. 
210. 40 F.3d 1266, 1269-71 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 300f(1)(C) (2006); § 300g-1(b)(7)(A); Am. Water Works, 40 F.3d at
1268-69.
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“feasible” to adopt a maximum contaminant level for lead even
though it was undisputed that the substance was physically capable
of being measured at a reasonable cost.212 The agency explained that
most lead enters public water systems through corrosion from
service lines and plumbing facilities that are beyond its regulatory
authority, and that aggressive use of corrosion control techniques
necessary to comply with a maximum contaminant level for lead
would undermine the statutory purpose by introducing more
harmful chemicals into the water supply.213 The D.C. Circuit agreed
with the agency’s position that “because the Congress apparently
did not anticipate a situation in which monitoring for one contami-
nant, although possible, is not conducive to overall water quality, it
impliedly delegated to the agency the discretion to specify a
treatment technique instead of” a maximum contaminant level for
lead.214 The court therefore held that the statutory term “feasible”
did not have a plain meaning under the circumstances.215 Rather,
the court explained that “where a literal reading of a statutory term
would lead to absurd results, the term simply ‘has no plain meaning
... and is the proper subject of construction by the EPA and the
courts.’”216 The court noted that this canon would be implicated if
the plaintiff’s proposed interpretation of the statute was accepted
because “it could lead to a result squarely at odds with the purpose
of the Safe Drinking Water Act.”217 After concluding that the
relevant statutory language was ambiguous, the court upheld the
agency’s interpretation of the term “feasible” on the grounds that a
decision to forego a single national standard in favor of a treatment
technique that required public water systems to adopt custom
corrosion control plans for lead was reasonable in light of the overall
statutory purpose of promoting safe drinking water.218 The plaintiff’s
challenge to the agency’s interpretation of the statute was therefore
rejected.
212. See Am. Water Works, 40 F.3d at 1270. 
213. See id. at 1270-71.
214. Id.
215. See id. at 1271.
216. Id. (quoting Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 126
(1985)). 
217. Id.
218. See id.
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In much the same fashion, changed circumstances can create
legal ambiguity (and, thus, space for policy innovations by agencies)
that did not exist when a statute was enacted, or perhaps even
change the meaning of a regulatory statute altogether. For example,
in Bob Jones University v. United States, plaintiffs challenged the
validity of the Internal Revenue Service’s newly established position
that private schools that discriminate on the basis of race do not
qualify as tax-exempt organizations under the Internal Revenue
Code.219 Although plaintiffs appeared to satisfy the statutory
requirements for tax-exempt status solely by virtue of being
organized for “educational purposes,”220 and it was undisputed that
the Congresses that enacted tax exemptions for charitable organiza-
tions would not have regarded racially segregated educational
institutions as against public policy,221 the Supreme Court agreed
with the IRS that the relevant provisions of the Tax Code incorpo-
rated certain common law principles of charitable trusts.222 As a
result, institutions seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public
purpose and not violate established public policy.223 Because there
was no longer any room for doubt that “racial discrimination in
education violates deeply and widely accepted views of elementary
justice”224 by the time the IRS adopted the challenged policy, the
Court concluded that the agency’s revised interpretation of the
statute was unquestionably correct.225 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court explicitly recognized that Congress has always “seen fit
to vest in those administering the tax laws very broad authority to
interpret those laws,” for “[i]n an area as complex as the tax system,
the agency Congress vests with administrative responsibility must
219. 461 U.S. 574, 577-78 (1983). Prior to 1970, the IRS granted tax-exempt status to
private schools without regard to their admissions policies. See id. The IRS formalized the
new policy at issue in a revenue ruling that was promulgated in 1971. See id. (citing Rev. Rul.
71-447, 1971-2 C. B. 230). 
220. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 613 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(identifying the statutory requirements for tax-exempt status, and claiming that there is no
“additional, undefined public policy requirement”). 
221. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 593 n.20 (acknowledging this reality, but claiming that
“contemporary standards must be considered in determining whether given activities provide
a public benefit and are entitled to the charitable tax exemption”).
222. See id. at 586-92. 
223. See id. at 591. 
224. Id. at 592.
225. Id. at 595.
2013] STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 267
be able to exercise its authority to meet changing conditions and
new problems.”226
Thus far, this Section has focused on an agency’s obligation to
respect Congress’s policy choices, as well as the flexibility that
agencies can and should exercise to avoid unintended absurdities
and interpret statutes dynamically when they implement or carry
out federal programs. Because agencies operate within the electoral
dimension of democracy and may act arbitrarily when they make
such determinations, however, the judiciary should review these
aspects of agency decision making. As previously explained, courts
should give an agency’s judgment about whether Congress unambig-
uously resolved a particular question an appropriate amount of
respect, but the judiciary must ultimately reach its own conclusions
about whether an agency’s decision was foreclosed by the statute. If
the court determines that Congress neither compelled nor foreclosed
the agency’s chosen option, and the agency’s decision was therefore
permissible under the statute, then the court must proceed to
determine whether the agency’s policy decision was reasonable
under the circumstances.227 The court should therefore engage in
hard-look judicial review and determine whether the agency
engaged in reasoned deliberation when it made the contested policy
decision.228
This proposed analytical framework responds to the serious
concern that if courts fail to provide meaningful judicial review of
226. Id. at 596.
227. The Chevron framework can and should be understood in a similar fashion. See M.
Elizabeth Magill, Step Two of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, in A GUIDE TO
JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES, supra note 208, at 93. 
228. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1982)
(stating that in reviewing agency action, courts must consider “whether the [agency’s] decision
was based on consideration of the relevant factors”) (quoting Bowman Transp. Inc. v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974)). This proposed analytical framework
comports with the position of commentators who argue that Chevron step two should be
understood as the functional equivalent of arbitrary and capricious review. See Magill, supra
note 227, at 93-102 (providing examples of courts taking this approach, and arguing in its
favor); see also Ronald Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1253, 1254-55 (1997); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing
Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83
(1994); Seidenfeld, supra note 208, at 307-11. This form of judicial review should apply to an
agency’s decision to interpret a statute contrary to its plain meaning to avoid unintended
absurdities or to interpret a statute dynamically, see supra notes 209-26 and accompanying
text, as well as to an agency’s resolution of more standard ambiguities. 
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the resolution of statutory ambiguities by regulatory agencies, the
executive branch will acquire too much unrestrained lawmaking
power, and agencies could therefore arbitrarily dominate the
people.229 Indeed, several commentators have previously recognized
that APA procedures and hard-look judicial review are specifically
designed to promote the principles of deliberative democracy, and
therefore to guard against these possibilities.230 
2. Statutory Interpretation Without Agencies
Although many interpretive problems in the modern regulatory
state involve challenges to the validity of agency action, courts
sometimes interpret statutes without meaningful input from
regulatory agencies with authority over a matter. These cases,
which have been the focus of most traditional theories of statutory
interpretation, should also be understood as mechanisms for
contestatory democracy. Generally speaking, the question is
whether a federal statute should be understood to allow a particular
type of adverse action against a party to litigation. Can the defen-
dant be convicted of a crime for engaging in certain behavior? Can
a private person or entity be enjoined from engaging in certain
behavior or held civilly liable for any resulting damages? The
individuals or groups who seek negative answers to the foregoing
questions are contesting the potential exercise of governmental
authority pursuant to the statute. Courts should therefore be
expected to give equal consideration to the competing views and to
provide good reasons for rejecting such challenges and reaching
affirmative answers. The judiciary should, however, sustain those
challenges when it concludes that a statute should not be under-
stood to authorize the coercive action at issue.
In assessing such challenges, courts should utilize the traditional
tools of statutory interpretation to evaluate whether Congress has
229. See Criddle, supra note 97, at 180-81; Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and
the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 525-26 (1989);
Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modern
Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 105-07 (2000);
see also Foote, supra note 169, at 708-11. 
230. See Seidenfeld, supra note 94, at 1512; Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular
Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 443-46
(2003); Sunstein, supra note 83, at 56-58; supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
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explicitly resolved the precise question at issue. If so, the court
should generally respect the legislature’s decision because Congress
has the primary authorial role in the lawmaking process,231 and the
constitutional structure provides significant protections against
arbitrary domination. If, however, the court concludes that Congress
has not clearly resolved the precise question at issue, then the court
should engage in reasoned deliberation about the best way of
implementing the statute on the merits in light of all of the relevant
considerations. The judiciary’s resolution of statutory ambiguities
and assessment of how to apply a statute to unanticipated problems
will admittedly involve policy making, but it is difficult to see how
this could possibly be avoided when neither Congress nor an
administrative agency has made a reasoned decision about the
proper application of the statute under the circumstances. More-
over, the point of contestatory democracy is to enable people to
challenge public decisions in an impartial forum on the grounds that
their perceived interests were not taken into account during the
lawmaking process, and that taking their views equally into account
compels a decision in their favor. The judiciary is limiting the
government’s capacity to engage in arbitrary domination and
thereby promoting freedom and democracy when it carries out this
role.
There are a couple of important methodological implications of
understanding statutory interpretation as contestatory democracy.
First, courts should make judicious use of certain substantive
canons of statutory interpretation under this theory. These canons,
which include the rule of lenity (interpret ambiguous criminal
statutes in favor of the defendant)232 and the avoidance canon (avoid
serious constitutional difficulties if another plausible interpretation
of the statute is available),233 have proven difficult to justify under
faithful agent theories. After all, their invocation tends to deviate
from the meaning the judiciary would otherwise attribute to the
statutory text based on policy considerations. In addition, there is
little reason to believe that Congress intended those particular
results (and even less basis accurately to predict how the legislature
231. See supra Part III.A.
232. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 44, at 375-82.
233. See id. at 360-67. 
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would have resolved a problem that it never anticipated), and the
application of these canons tends to undermine the underlying
statutory purposes. Yet, substantive canons are based on the notion
that Congress cannot outlaw private behavior or push the constitu-
tional envelope without engaging in reasoned deliberation on the
relevant issues.234 By interpreting ambiguous statutes in favor of
criminal defendants and against constitutional doubts, the judiciary
promotes constitutional norms and remands legal or policy ques-
tions to the legislature for more focused deliberation.235 In so doing,
the judiciary ordinarily resolves contests over the use of governmen-
tal authority in favor of individuals or groups who claim that their
perceived interests were not given adequate consideration, or any
consideration at all, during the legislative process.236 
For example, in United States v. Witkovich, the defendant was
indicted for refusing to answer questions under a statute that
authorized the Attorney General to require a deportable alien “to
give information under oath as to his nationality, circumstances,
habits, associations, and activities, and such other information,
whether or not related to the foregoing, as the Attorney General
may deem fit and proper.”237 Witkovich moved to dismiss the
indictment on the grounds that it failed to state an offense within
the meaning of the statute, and that, in the alternative, the statute
was unconstitutional.238 The Supreme Court held that the statute
did not authorize the Attorney General to question a deportable
alien about his political and social activities or associations, and
instead limited the statute’s scope “to authorizing all questions
reasonably calculated to keep the Attorney General advised
regarding the continued availability for departure of aliens whose
deportation is overdue.”239 The Court explained that the underlying
234. See Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon,
Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 397, 446 (2005). 
235. See id.
236. For the foregoing reasons, the rule of lenity and the avoidance canon should also
potentially trump an agency’s preferred understanding of a statute in appropriate cases. See
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 71, at 1166-67. 
237. 353 U.S. 194, 194-95 (1957) (citing Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-
414, 68 Stat. 1232 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1252(d) (Supp. II) (2006))). 
238. Id. at 195.
239. Id. at 202.
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purpose of the statute was to facilitate an alien’s availability for
deportation, the Senate Judiciary Committee expressed a reluctance
to push the constitutional envelope,240 and accepting the interpreta-
tion proposed by the government would raise serious constitutional
questions.241 In dismissing the indictment, the Court essentially
concluded that if Congress wanted to give the Attorney General
such expansive authority, it should amend the statute and make
this decision more explicit.242 In the process, Congress would
presumably be required to give more careful consideration to the
avowable interests of deportable aliens as well as the relevant
constitutional norms. In the absence of solid evidence of reasoned
deliberation on this issue by the legislature, however, the Court
signaled that it would construe the statute in a manner that avoid-
ed the arbitrary domination of Witkovich and other deportable
aliens.243
More generally, when statutory interpretation is understood as
a mechanism of contestatory democracy, courts should eschew
dogmatic reliance on any of the “foundational” theories of statutory
interpretation that are suggested by faithful agent theory, and
should instead engage in a process of “practical reasoning.”244
William Eskridge and Philip Frickey have succinctly described the
three defining elements of this pragmatic approach to statutory
interpretation. First, practical reasoning candidly recognizes that
“statutory interpretation involves creative policymaking by judges
and is not just the Court’s figuring out the answer that was put ‘in’
the statute by the enacting legislature.”245 Second, “because this
creation of statutory meaning is not a mechanical operation, it
often involves the interpreter’s choice among several competing
answers.”246 Third, “when statutory interpreters make these choices,
they are normally not driven by any single value,” but rather they
are typically influenced by a number of potentially competing
240. See id. at 201.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 200.
243. See id. at 199-201.
244. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 322 (1990). 
245. Id. at 345. 
246. Id. at 347. 
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values,247 including modern circumstances and norms.248 Nonethe-
less, Eskridge and Frickey endorse a hierarchy of sources, which
places the greatest weight on textual considerations; followed by the
original expectations of the enacting Congress; and, finally, the
purposes attributed to the statute over time and contemporary
public values reflected in related statutes, evolving constitutional
norms, and prevailing ideas of fairness.249 They also rely on the
metaphor of the “hermeneutical circle,” which posits that “[a] part
can only be understood in the context of the whole, and the whole
cannot be understood without analyzing its various parts.”250
Interpreters must engage in a “to and fro movement” among all of
the relevant considerations, which in turn influences how each
relevant consideration is understood.251 Eskridge and Frickey
emphasize that judges should adopt the “hermeneutical attitude”
when engaging in this analysis, and that “a true dialogue with the
text requires the interpreter to reconsider her preunderstandings
as she considers the specific evidence in the case, and then to
formulate a new understanding, which in turn is subject to reconsid-
eration.”252 After all, “the whole purpose of practical reasoning” is to
understand opposing evidence and attempt “to derive a practical
solution in the specific case at hand.”253 This purpose can be
achieved only when the interpreter embraces an approach “in which
all useful and relevant evidence is considered, and disagreement is
embraced rather than suppressed.”254 
The use of practical reasoning in statutory interpretation is
remarkably similar to the type of reasoned deliberation that is
central to deliberative democratic theory,255 and this method of
statutory interpretation is therefore most conducive to avoiding
arbitrary domination by the state. In this regard, practical reason-
ing and reasoned deliberation both take all of the relevant consider-
ations and values into account in an effort to reach the best decision
247. Id. at 348.
248. See id. at 351-52 (describing the “dynamic element” of this approach). 
249. See id. at 359.
250. Id. at 351.
251. See id. at 352.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 365.
254. Id. 
255. See supra notes 145-54 and accompanying text.
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under the circumstances in each particular case. Moreover, practical
reasoning and reasoned deliberation are both dialectical and
dialogic approaches to decision making, which require public
officials to give serious consideration to the arguments presented by
the participating parties. Both approaches require decision makers
to remain open-minded and be willing to change or modify their
views or positions in response to new information or arguments.
Both approaches affirmatively embrace complexity and disagree-
ment and seek to use the best available information and competing
arguments to help decision makers reach the most justifiable
solutions to concrete problems. Because decision makers are fallible
and new information or arguments could subsequently be developed
that would improve our understanding of the best approach to a
problem, both approaches recognize that public officials should
make modest decisions that preserve flexibility for the future. In
short, legal and policy decisions should be minimalistic, incremen-
tal, dynamic, and above all, provisional. Practical reasoning and
reasoned deliberation therefore contrast sharply with faithful agent
theories of statutory interpretation, which are designed to convey
the impression that the legislature finally decided everything when
the statute was originally enacted.256
Although practical reasoning and deliberative democratic theory
both trust public officials with substantial discretionary authority,
they also provide meaningful constraints that protect citizens from
arbitrary domination by the state. Deliberative democracy pre-
cludes participants in the lawmaking process from justifying their
positions based solely on “naked preferences,” and requires them
instead to give “public-regarding” reasons for their preferred courses
of action.257 Factual or empirical claims should be based on reliable
methods of inquiry and consistent with the best available informa-
tion.258 Similarly, practical reasoning in statutory interpretation is
constrained by the historical text and the interpreter’s moral
256. Cf. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY?, supra note 95, at 19
(“Deliberative democracy’s provisionality checks the excesses of conventional democracy’s
finality.”). 
257. See Staszewski, supra note 147, at 1279-84 (discussing the value of reason-giving); see
also Thompson, supra note 95, at 498 (explaining that a reason-giving requirement is “[a]t the
core of all theories of deliberative democracy”).
258. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 95, at 15, 56. 
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obligations “to learn from the text, respond to the text, and reach
common ground with the text” in resolving specific problems.259 In
addition, “the interpreter’s perspective itself is conditioned by
tradition—the evolution of the historical text as it has been
interpreted, the values of society, and current circumstances.”260
Eskridge and Frickey contend that “[w]hile these constraints
certainly do not dictate a result, the interpreter cannot disregard
the force of that which envelops and situates her in present
society.”261 Indeed, the historical text and tradition that constrain
the permissible results in statutory interpretation are almost
certainly more restrictive in most cases than the basic obligations
of deliberative democratic theory. This disparity makes perfect
sense, however, when one considers that legislators and administra-
tors are frequently playing the primary authorial role in the
lawmaking process. The judiciary, on the other hand, is merely
playing an editorial role that is designed to implement the statute
in as justifiable a manner as possible in particular cases—and
thereby limit the government’s capacity to engage in arbitrary
domination of the people.
Perhaps most important for present purposes, the dialectical and
dialogic aspects of deliberative democracy and practical reasoning,
and the duties they impose upon public officials to provide reasoned
explanations for their decisions, improve the democratic legitimacy
of legal and policy decisions by the state. Deliberative democratic
theory recognizes that reasoned deliberation provides decision
makers with the information and competing arguments necessary
to ascertain their own views.262 Because the accompanying discus-
sion can lead to an agreement, or at least an informed vote, on the
best course of action on the merits under the circumstances, the
resulting decision should be viewed as legitimate from the perspec-
tive of the prevailing majority.263 The products of deliberative
democracy are also legitimate from the standpoint of the minority,
however, “if the minority’s interests and perspectives were ade-
259. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 244, at 382. 
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See Staszewski, supra note 147, at 1282. 
263. See id. at 1282-83; see also Manin, supra note 95, at 341-44 (outlining Abbé Sieyès’s
argument that majority will is a necessary source of legitimacy). 
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quately considered during the decision-making process and the
prevailing outcome is one that ‘could be the object of a free and
reasoned agreement among equals.’”264 The related obligation of
public officials to give reasoned explanations for their decisions that
satisfy this standard helps to ensure that they make legitimate
choices based on the best available information and that losing
parties are not subject to arbitrary domination by the state.265
Similarly, the process of practical reasoning allows a court to
reach a decision about the best resolution of a particular case, but
this occurs only after a judge has considered a broad range of
evidence and tested her preliminary views of the statute against
other possible interpretations.266 This approach requires an inter-
preter to evaluate statutory problems from a variety of different
perspectives, and to carefully consider the competing positions of
the parties and the arguments that point most strongly in each
side’s favor.267 It also requires the court to provide a justification for
its decision that responds in a reasoned fashion to the relevant
considerations.268 Eskridge and Frickey have persuasively argued
that “[i]f performed candidly and with empathetic appreciation for
the point of view of others (the classic assumptions of hermeneu-
tics), the to and fro movement among the considerations suggested
by our practical reasoning model is a more legitimate approach to
statutory interpretation than the supposedly ‘objective’ foundation-
alist approaches.”269 They therefore conclude that “[t]he Court ought
to acknowledge that, standing alone, textualist and archeological
approaches to statutory interpretation are overly simplistic tech-
niques that provide only a chimera of the legitimacy the Court
seeks.”270 In contrast, “practical reasoning legitimates statutory
interpretation through deliberation and candor” by encouraging
judges to consider all of the relevant information and views to reach
practical solutions to the concrete problems presented by difficult
cases.271 In other words, when statutory interpretation is understood
264. Staszewski, supra note 147, at 1283 (quoting Cohen, supra note 95, at 22). 
265. See id. 
266. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 244, at 352. 
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 364. 
270. Id. at 383. 
271. Id. 
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as a mechanism of contestatory democracy, the creative elaboration
of statutory meaning by the judiciary pursuant to a dialectical
process of practical reasoning is significantly more democratic than
the invocation of a pretense that the legislature provided a single
correct answer to the precise question at issue,272 which could be
divined solely through the application of textualist, intentionalist,
or purposive methods. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, co-
operative partner theories of statutory interpretation are potentially
more democratic than faithful agent models.
3. Statutory Interpretation with Agency Guidance
The judiciary frequently interprets statutes in the modern
regulatory state with guidance from administrative agencies. This
group of cases is formally distinct from judicial review of agency law
making because the relevant agency did not interpret the statute
pursuant to delegated lawmaking authority—either because the
agency did not possess such authority or because the agency did not
follow the requisite lawmaking procedures. Nonetheless, such cases
are often functionally indistinguishable from judicial review of
agency law making because the plaintiff is challenging the validity
of agency action as arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law.273 On
the other hand, the cases in this category cover a broad range in
terms of the procedural formality of the agency’s decision and the
extent to which the agency is involved in the litigation. Even where
the agency’s guidance is relatively informal and the agency is not a
party to the lawsuit, however, the court must generally decide
whether it agrees with an agency’s preferred interpretation and
whether, or how, the statute should be interpreted to regulate a
private citizen’s conduct. Accordingly, these cases will generally
involve challenges to the validity of particular exercises of govern-
mental authority under the statute, and they should therefore also
be understood as providing a mechanism for contestatory democ-
racy.
272. See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 222-26 (2001) (challenging the
legality of a ruling letter issued by the Customs Service that resulted in the imposition of a
tariff on the importation of plaintiff’s day planners). 
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The judiciary is formally responsible for interpreting statutes in
this category of cases, and it will accordingly play an editorial role
when Congress has not explicitly resolved the precise question at
issue, much like in cases where courts interpret statutes without
agencies. Courts should therefore make judicious use of substantive
canons and engage in practical reasoning when they perform this
role.274 Unlike statutory interpretation without agencies, however,
courts have the benefit of interpretive guidance from agencies in
this context, and agencies have numerous institutional advantages
when it comes to identifying Congress’s explicit policy choices and
ascertaining the best way of implementing a statute under the
circumstances.275 Accordingly, the judiciary should treat an agency’s
interpretation of a statute with an appropriate degree of respect in
cases of this nature.276 
The degree of respect that is warranted will vary, however, based
on the extent to which the agency engaged in reasoned deliberation
in reaching its decision. If the agency reached its decision pursuant
to a deliberative process that carefully considered competing
interests and perspectives, and the agency provided a reasoned
explanation for its decision that could be the object of a free and
reasoned agreement among equals, then courts should generally
defer to the agency’s decision. If, however, the agency reached a
conclusion without consulting the general public, the judiciary
should uphold the agency’s decision only if the court is independ-
ently persuaded that the agency has chosen the most justifiable
option under the circumstances. In any event, courts should reject
agency interpretations that they find unpersuasive in this particu-
lar context. In short, the weight of the agency’s “judgment in a
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give
it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”277
When statutory interpretation is understood as a mechanism of
contestatory democracy, judicial decisions about the most justifiable
way of interpreting ambiguous statutes should be considered
274. See supra Part III.C.2.
275. See supra notes 186-95 and accompanying text.
276. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
277. Id.
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provisional in this category of cases.278 The judiciary should
therefore be willing to reconsider its interpretive decisions when
agencies subsequently engage in reasoned deliberation on a
particular question and reach a persuasive decision that differs from
the previous conclusion of a court. This is particularly true when the
agency’s subsequent decision is a product of especially deliberative
procedures, such as notice-and-comment rule making,279 and where
the agency was delegated formal lawmaking authority on the matter
or the relevant circumstances have materially changed since the
time of the judiciary’s earlier decision.280 This understanding of
statutory interpretation makes sense of the Court’s occasional
practice of invalidating an agency’s interpretation of a statute, while
simultaneously inviting the agency to reconsider the underlying
policy question by promulgating a regulation pursuant to notice-
and-comment rule making.281
IV. RECOGNIZING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AS CONTESTATORY
DEMOCRACY
This Article claims that statutory interpretation in the modern
regulatory state should be understood as a mechanism of con-
testatory democracy, and it sketches the basic roles of Congress,
administrative agencies, and the judiciary from this perspective.
Although this theory provides a different way of thinking about
statutory interpretation and its democratic legitimacy, it would not
lead to radical changes in legal doctrine or dramatically alter the
judiciary’s approach to statutory problems. On the contrary, the
proposed theory is largely consistent with existing legal doctrine,
and recent empirical literature on statutory interpretation suggests
that it is also largely compatible with how statutory interpretation
278. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in
Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1276 (2002) (arguing that after Mead,
“reasonable [judicial] construction of regulatory statutes” should be given “stare decisis effect
only until [the responsible] agency sets forth its own permissible [and binding] inter-
pretation”). 
279. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
280. See Bamberger, supra note 278, at 1311.
281. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 71, at 1192 & nn.344-45 (describing several cases in
which the Court has followed this approach, and claiming that this practice should be
encouraged).
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currently operates in practice.282 Nonetheless, if statutory interpre-
tation were reconceptualized as a mechanism of contestatory
democracy, we would gain a better understanding of certain cases
and be able to see why other decisions went wrong, in addition to
having a better way of thinking about future problems.
In recent years, there has been a wave of interdisciplinary legal
scholarship that has examined how courts interpret statutes from
an empirical perspective. Without getting into all of the nuances of
the findings, it seems fair to say that there is substantial empirical
support for the notion that statutory interpretation in the modern
regulatory state functions as a mechanism of contestatory democ-
racy, and this Article’s most significant normative prescriptions are
consistent with the judiciary’s existing practices.283 Thus, for
starters, scholars have recognized since the dawn of the Chevron era
that “it is a defining characteristic of the administrative state that
most statutes are not direct commands to the public enforced
exclusively by courts, but are delegations to administrative agencies
to issue and enforce such commands.”284 It is therefore not surpris-
ing that many statutory problems in the modern regulatory state
involve challenges to the legality of agency action.285 Moreover, it is
generally accepted that federal courts are not obligated to give stare
decisis effect to their interpretive methodologies in statutory
cases,286 which means that the judiciary can use different ap-
proaches to deciding different cases. Although the Court has
suggested that its doctrines for deferring to agency interpretations
of statutes should be treated as binding precedent, the Court has
declined to follow its own doctrinal pronouncements on any con-
sistent basis.287 A number of studies have found that the Court
282. See infra notes 284-90 and accompanying text.
283. See studies cited infra notes 288-89.
284. Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
549, 551 (1985); see also Rubin, supra note 173, at 369. 
285. See supra notes 125-34 and accompanying text. 
286. See Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation
Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863 (2008) (asserting that the status quo should change to give
statutory interpretation methodology stare decisis effect); Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic
Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898,
1901-02 (2011). 
287. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 71, at 1086-91; Connor N. Raso & William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates
Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1730-35 (2010). 
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relies on a variety of different considerations in deciding statutory
cases, including legislative history, and that it frequently pays
significant attention to legal precedent and a broad range of
pragmatic considerations.288 In other words, these studies suggest
that the Court engages in practical reasoning when it interprets
statutes.289 The Eskridge and Baer study reached similar conclusions
about the Court’s methodology in cases in which an agency interpre-
tation of a statute was at issue.290 Although the Supreme Court has
applied its own deference doctrine in a wildly inconsistent fashion,
there is also clear doctrinal support for the following propositions:
(1) agencies and courts are both legally obligated to follow the
legislature’s decision when Congress has explicitly resolved the
precise question at issue;291 (2) agency interpretations are formally
entitled to greater deference when they are made pursuant to an
explicit delegation of lawmaking authority from Congress;292 (3)
agencies are permitted to deviate from the plain meaning of
statutory language to avoid unintended absurdities;293 (4) an
agency’s resolution of statutory ambiguity pursuant to an explicit
delegation of lawmaking authority is subject to judicial review for
288. See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First
Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 223-26 (2010); Jane S.
Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1 (1998); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical
Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073 (1992). 
289. While most empirical studies of statutory interpretation have focused on the Supreme
Court’s methodology, Frank Cross has made similar findings in a study of the lower federal
courts. See FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 199
(2009) (“It is clear from the findings that pluralism rules the day in judicial statutory
interpretation.”). 
290. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 71, at 1117-18. 
291. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004) (“[W]e
neither defer nor settle on any degree of deference because the Commission is clearly wrong.”);
Herz, supra note 208, at 144 (“Where the statute is clear enough to allow the court to resolve
the case in step one of Chevron, then the court would uphold or set aside the agency view, as
the case may be, under either Skidmore or Chevron.” (emphasis omitted)). 
292. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001). But cf. Eskridge & Baer,
supra note 71, at 1124-29 (discussing the influence of delegated lawmaking authority on the
Court’s deference to agency interpretations and finding that “congressional delegation is not
a solid predictor of when the Court will invoke Chevron, but it is correlated with, and may
influence, the agency’s chances of prevailing once Chevron has been invoked”). 
293. See supra notes 209-18 and accompanying text. 
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reasoned decision making;294 (5) agencies can change their interpre-
tations of ambiguous statutory provisions pursuant to deliberate
processes if they provide reasoned explanations for doing so;295 (6)
agency interpretations are entitled to greater respect when the
agency has followed a participatory and deliberative procedure;296
and (7) agency interpretations are entitled to greater respect when
the agency has reached a reasoned decision on a particular
question.297 Accordingly, there is nothing to preclude agencies or
courts from assuming the roles that are suggested by this Article’s
proposed understanding of statutory interpretation, and the judici-
ary already follows the broad outlines of this approach in many
cases.
While understanding statutory interpretation as a mechanism of
contestatory democracy is therefore consistent with the existing
legal doctrine and empirical reality, it also provides the best
explanation for many judicial decisions. For one recent example,
consider Dada v. Mukasey.298 Mr. Dada was a citizen and native of
Nigeria, who came to the United States in the late 1990s on a tem-
porary nonimmigrant visa. In 2004, the Department of Homeland
Security charged Dada with being removable under the Immigration
and Nationality Act for overstaying his visa.299 An immigration
judge found Dada to be removable and granted his request for
“voluntary departure,” which was affirmed without opinion by the
294. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
295. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514 (2009); Nat’l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005); see also supra note 194
and accompanying text. 
296. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 140 (1944). Eskridge and Baer found little
evidence to support this proposition in the Court’s practice, but they argue that the Court
should give greater deference to agency decisions that are made pursuant to notice-and-
comment rule making, partly because of “the legitimacy-conferring features of [open]
deliberation.” See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 71, at 1147-48, 1171, 1177-80. 
297. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; see also Eskridge & Baer, supra note 71, at 1180-81
(reporting that “the most significant variable” in determining whether the Court deferred to
an agency’s interpretation of a statute was whether the agency was “applying special
expertise to a technical issue” and “applying its understanding of the facts to carry out
congressional purposes,” and claiming that the Court should be most deferential under these
circumstances); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235 (2007) (describing the application of the
“Skidmore factors” by the lower federal courts).
298. 554 U.S. 1 (2008). 
299. Id. at 6.
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Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).300 Dada was therefore ordered
to leave the country within thirty days or suffer statutory penalties,
including a significant fine and ineligibility for various forms of
relief for a period of ten years.301 Shortly before this thirty-day
period expired, however, Dada moved to withdraw his request for
voluntary departure.302 He simultaneously filed a motion to reopen
his proceedings based on new and material facts that allegedly
demonstrated a basis for a change in his legal status.303 Several
months later, the BIA denied Dada’s motion to reopen his proceed-
ings on the grounds that he had overstayed his voluntary departure
period. The BIA did not rule on his motion to withdraw his request
for voluntary departure or consider the merits of his motion to
reopen his removal proceedings.304
The issue for the Supreme Court was “whether an alien who has
requested and been granted voluntary departure from the United
States ... must adhere to that election and depart within the time
prescribed, even if doing so causes the alien to forgo a ruling on a
pending, unresolved motion to reopen the removal proceedings.”305
The applicable statute provides that if an alien’s request for
voluntary departure is granted after she is found removable, the
alien must leave the country within sixty days.306 The grant of a
petition for voluntary departure benefits both the alien and the
government.307 From the government’s perspective, an alien’s
agreement to leave voluntarily speeds the departure process and
avoids the expenses of deportation, in addition to reducing the need
for subsequent litigation.308 In return, the alien avoids the possibil-
ity of extended detention within the United States, receives greater
flexibility in deciding when to depart, and can select the country of
destination. Perhaps most important, by agreeing to depart
voluntarily, the alien avoids some of the penalties that result from
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 6-7.
304. Id. at 7.
305. Id. at 4. 
306. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2) (2006). 
307. See Dada, 554 U.S. at 11-12. 
308. See id. at 11.
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deportation and thereby improves her chances for readmission.309
The applicable statute, however, also provides that every alien
ordered removed from the United States has a right to file one
motion to reopen her removal proceedings based on newly discov-
ered evidence or a change in circumstances since the hearing.310
Pursuant to Department of Justice regulations, an alien’s departure
from the country has the effect of withdrawing her motion to reopen
her removal proceedings.311 Accordingly, the Court recognized that
the statute and regulations appeared to place aliens in Dada’s
situation in a Catch-22, because they were required to choose
between abiding by the terms of their voluntary departure
agreements or pursuing motions to reopen their immigration
proceedings.312
The Court was therefore required to determine whether the
statutory right to reopen removal proceedings is qualified by the
voluntary departure process.313 Before addressing the parties’
arguments, the Court pointed out that neither the statutory text nor
the legislative history addressed this specific question, and it was
therefore not explicitly resolved by Congress.314 Dada argued that
filing a motion to reopen should be understood to toll the voluntary
departure period pending the motion’s resolution.315 The Court
rejected this position, however, because it would reconfigure the
voluntary departure scheme in a manner that would be inconsistent
with the statutory design.316 Specifically, while an alien would
continue to receive “the full benefits of voluntary departure,” the
advantages of this disposition to the government—namely, a prompt
and costless departure—would be lost.317 This approach would also
“invite abuse by aliens who wish to stay in the country but whose
cases are not likely to be reopened by immigration authorities.”318
309. Id. at 11-12.
310. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A).
311. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2012).
312. See Dada, 554 U.S. at 5. 
313. Id.
314. See id. at 14-15. 
315. See id. at 19.
316. See id.
317. See id. at 19-20.
318. Id. at 20. 
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The government argued, in contrast, that an alien’s decision to
seek and accept a voluntary departure order should be understood
to result in the waiver of her statutory right to reopen her immigra-
tion proceedings.319 The Court was not persuaded by the govern-
ment’s position either, however, because it would nullify the
statutory right to seek reopening in most cases of voluntary
departure.320 Because “[t]he purpose of the motion to reopen is to
ensure a proper and lawful disposition,” the Court concluded that it
“must be reluctant to assume that the voluntary departure statute
was designed to remove this important safeguard for the distinct
class of deportable aliens most favored by the same law.”321 This was
especially true when aliens were not given prior notice that
accepting voluntary departure would result in the loss of their
statutory right to reopen their proceedings,322 and “when the plain
text of the statute reveals no such limitation.”323
Having rejected the preferred positions of both parties, the Court
concluded that it was necessary to adopt a compromise that would
simultaneously “preserve the alien’s right to pursue reopening while
respecting the Government’s interest in the quid pro quo of the
voluntary departure arrangement.”324 The Court held that “to
safeguard the right to pursue a motion to reopen for voluntary
departure recipients, the alien must be permitted to withdraw,
unilaterally, a voluntary departure request before expiration of the
departure period, without regard to the underlying merits of the
motion to reopen.”325 The alien therefore “has the option either to
abide by the terms, and receive the agreed-upon benefits, of
voluntary departure; or, alternatively, to forgo those benefits and
remain in the United States to pursue an administrative motion.”326
The Court explained that while “this interpretation still confronts
the alien with a hard choice, it avoids both the quixotic results of the
Government’s proposal and the elimination of benefits to the
319. See id. at 15. 
320. See id. at 15-18.
321. Id. at 18.
322. See id. at 15-16.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 19.
325. Id. at 21.
326. Id.
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Government that would follow from petitioner’s tolling rule.”327
Because Dada requested the withdrawal of his motion for voluntary
departure prior to the expiration of his statutory departure period,
the Court concluded that the BIA should have granted his request
and allowed him to pursue his motion to reopen his removal
proceedings.328 Dada therefore prevailed in his challenge to the
legality of the agency’s decision under the statute.
Dada v. Mukasey provides a vivid example of how statutory
interpretation functions as a mechanism of contestatory democracy
for several reasons. First, the case provided the petitioner with an
opportunity to contest the government’s refusal to consider his
motion to reopen his removal proceedings on the merits on the
grounds that the government’s view of the statute was contrary to
law. Second, although the Court considered the statutory language,
the legislative history, and the underlying purposes of the relevant
provisions in evaluating the parties’ positions, the Court openly
acknowledged that Congress did not explicitly resolve the precise
question at issue or have an ascertainable intent.329 Third, the Court
gave equal consideration to the interests and perspectives of both
parties, and ultimately adopted a reasoned decision that was
responsive to their concerns and cognizant of the practical conse-
quences of different courses of action. Nonetheless, the Court
ultimately rejected the positions of both parties and adopted a
deliberative compromise that would better promote the underlying
purposes of the statute than the proposed alternatives.330 Fourth,
the Court explicitly recognized that its decision was provisional, and
that the Justice Department, which has the authority to promulgate
rules to carry out this program, could potentially adopt another
solution to this problem after engaging in reasoned deliberation.331
Indeed, the Court pointed out that a proposed rule by the Justice
Department, which would have resolved the problem in a manner
similar to the solution adopted by the Court, was entitled to the
327. Id.
328. See id. at 22. 
329. See id. at 15-18.
330. See id.
331. Id. at 20 (“Although a statute or regulation might be adopted to resolve the dilemma
in a different manner, as matters now stand the appropriate way to reconcile the voluntary
departure and motion to reopen provisions is to allow an alien to withdraw the request for
voluntary departure before expiration of the departure period.”). 
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Court’s respect during the interpretive process.332 Finally, and
perhaps most fundamentally, there is no question that the Court
was making a policy decision in resolving this case, and thereby
editing the statute that was authored by Congress. Justice Scalia
complained in his dissenting opinion that the Court was exceeding
the scope of its authority by “blue-pencil[ing]” the statute in this
fashion.333 He also claimed that because the Justice Department was
actively considering the adoption of new regulations on this issue,
the Court’s “interpretive gymnastics may have been performed, not
for the enjoyment of innumerable aliens in the future, but for Mr.
Dada alone.”334 If statutory interpretation is understood as a
mechanism of contestatory democracy, however, it becomes
apparent that the Court’s decision limited the government’s capacity
to engage in the arbitrary domination of Mr. Dada, and that the
Court’s resolution of this problem was therefore affirmatively
democratic.
There are, of course, other cases that would appear to have been
wrongly decided if statutory interpretation is understood as a
mechanism of contestatory democracy. United States v. Locke stands
out as a particularly striking example of a case in which the Court
is undoubtedly correct about what the statute means, but Justice
Stevens’ dissenting opinion provides a more persuasive account of
how the statute should be interpreted if the judiciary’s role is to
provide individuals or groups with an opportunity to contest the
arbitrary exercise of governmental authority.335 The Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976 required property owners with
mining claims on public lands to register their initial claims with
the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) within three years of the
statute’s enactment, and to make annual filings with the agency
“prior to December 31” of each subsequent year.336 The Locke family,
who had earned their livelihood since 1960 by producing millions of
dollars worth of gravel and other building materials from ten
mining claims on federal land in Nevada, submitted their initial
332. See id.
333. Id. at 27 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
334. Id. at 30. 
335. 471 U.S. 84, 119-21 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
336. 43 U.S.C. § 1744(a) (2006). 
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registrations for those claims in a timely fashion.337 They proceeded
to send their daughter, who worked in the family’s business office,
to the BLM’s regional office in Ely, Nevada, to ascertain how to
comply with the statute’s annual filing requirement.338 It was
undisputed that she was told by agency employees that the required
documents should be filed at the Reno office “on or before December
31, 1980.”339 Pursuant to this advice, the Lockes travelled more than
700 miles to hand-deliver the documents to the BLM’s Reno office
for filing on December 31, 1980. Several months later, the Lockes
were first notified by the BLM that their property rights were
“abandoned and void,” because they had filed their mining claims
one day too late.340 After an unsuccessful administrative appeal, the
Lockes filed a lawsuit against the federal government claiming that
the extinguishment of their property rights was unconstitutional
under the circumstances.341
The Court explained that before addressing the merits of the
constitutional issues, it should first consider whether the statute
could fairly be construed in a manner that would avoid those
questions.342 The Lockes argued that the statutory requirement of
a filing “prior to December 31 of each year” should be interpreted to
require a filing “on or before December 31,” and that the BLM had
therefore acted unlawfully in voiding their claims.343 The majority
concluded, however, that this position was foreclosed by the plain
language of the statute.344 The Court emphasized that adhering to
a literal interpretation of the statute was particularly appropriate
in this context because the point of a deadline is to have a deadline,
and the particular date that is chosen is inherently arbitrary.345 The
Court also pointed out that the plaintiffs could have ascertained the
correct filing date by carefully reading the statute or the agency’s
regulations or by obtaining legal counsel, and that there was
337. See Locke, 471 U.S. at 89.
338. Id. at 114 (Powell, J., dissenting).
339. See id. at 89-90 n.7. 
340. Id. at 90.
341. Id. at 91.
342. See id. at 92. 
343. See id. at 93; see also supra note 233 and accompanying text (describing the avoidance
canon). 
344. See Locke, 471 U.S. at 93-96. 
345. See id. at 93.
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nothing in the legislative history to prove that the text contained
a scrivener’s error.346 While the Court acknowledged that the
statutory language may have been clumsy or confusing, the Court
concluded that it was required to apply the “prior to December 31”
language by its terms because the statute’s meaning was clear.347
The Court explained that “[t]here is a basic difference between
filling a gap left by Congress’ silence and rewriting rules that
Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted.”348
Justice Stevens issued a dissenting opinion in which he claimed
that the majority’s decision was contrary to the likely intent of
Congress, unfairly created “a trap for unwary property owners,” and
unnecessarily engaged in constitutional adjudication.349 Justice
Stevens pointed out that the statute contained a number of drafting
problems, and he therefore concluded that in the context of a
statutory scheme that requires periodic filings on a calendar-year
basis, the choice of the language “prior to December 31” was at least
ambiguous and likely a scrivener’s error.350 This conclusion was
bolstered by the fact that “no one has suggested any rational basis
for omitting just one day from the period in which an annual
filing may be made,” and Justice Stevens “would not presume that
Congress deliberately created a trap for the unwary by such an
omission.”351 Indeed, the actions of the BLM merely highlighted the
confusing nature of the statutory language. Besides erroneously
telling the Lockes that they could file their mining claims by the end
of the year, the agency had previously issued a question and answer
pamphlet that mistakenly stated that annual filings had to be made
“on or before December 31,” and the agency’s current regulations
rephrased the statutory language in an apparent effort to make the
annual filing deadline more clear.352 In any event, Justice Stevens
argued that accepting mining claims that were filed “on December
31” would not undermine the statutory purpose of notifying the
BLM of the existence of alleged mining claims on public lands,
346. See id. at 95.
347. Id.
348. Id. (quotations and citation omitted). 
349. Id. at 117 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
350. Id. at 117-19.
351. Id. at 123. 
352. Id. at 89-90 n.7.
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evinced by the fact that the agency was willing to accept claims
submitted by mail, as long as they were postmarked by December
30 and received by the agency on or before January 19 of the
following year, as well as by the fact that the Lockes were first told
that their mining claims were abandoned several months after their
claims were filed with the agency.353 The BLM could therefore
plainly exercise the authority to accept a mining claim that was
received after the statutory deadline, and its refusal to do so under
the circumstances meant that the Lockes “lost their entire livelihood
for no practical reason, contrary to the intent of Congress, and
because of the hypertechnical construction of a poorly drafted
statute” by an agency that was interpreting the statute flexibly in
some contexts and inflexibly in others.354 Indeed, there was evidence
in the record to suggest that the BLM was “using every technical
construction of the statute to suck up active mining claims much as
a vacuum cleaner, if not watched closely, will suck up jewelry or
loose money.”355 Justice Stevens pointed out that according to the
BLM’s own calculations, “thousands of mining claims have been
terminated because filings made on December 31 were considered
untimely,” and he suggested that this information “confirm[s] the
picture painted by amici of a federal bureaucracy virtually running
amok, and surely operating contrary to the intent of Congress, by
terminating the valuable property rights of hardworking, productive
citizens of our country.”356 Based on this information and the
foregoing arguments, it seems readily apparent that deciding this
case in favor of the Lockes would have promoted freedom as non-
domination and thereby affirmatively promoted democracy,
irrespective of the plain meaning of the statutory text. 
Finally, in thinking about the practical impact of understanding
statutory interpretation as a mechanism of contestatory democracy,
it is worthwhile to consider the “Tailoring Rule” that was recently
enacted by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as part of
353. See id. at 121-23 & nn.9, 11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The agency’s adoption of the
January 19 deadline illustrates that it does not need the information by December 30; that
it is not bound by the language of the provision; and that substantial compliance does not
interfere with the agency’s statutory functions or with the intent of Congress.”). 
354. Id. at 125. 
355. Id. at 124 n.12.
356. Id. 
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its effort to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.357 In Massachusetts
v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that greenhouse gases are “air
pollutant[s]” that are subject to regulation under the Clean Air
Act,358 and concluded that the agency was legally obligated to
determine “whether sufficient information exists to make an
endangerment finding” for greenhouse gases.359 Several years later,
after President Obama’s election, the EPA issued a series of
regulations related to greenhouse gases.360 First, the EPA issued an
Endangerment Finding,361 in which it determined that greenhouse
gases “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare.”362 Second, the EPA issued the Tailpipe Rule, which set
emission standards for cars and light trucks.363 Finally, the EPA
determined that the Clean Air Act requires major stationary sources
of greenhouse gases to obtain construction and operating permits.364
Because immediate regulation of all those sources would result in
overwhelming burdens on permitting authorities and regulated
entities, however, the agency issued the Timing and Tailoring
Rules, in which it determined that only the largest stationary
sources would initially be subject to permitting requirements.365
More specifically, when it promulgated the Tailoring Rule, the
EPA explained that it was “relieving overwhelming permitting
burdens that would, in the absence of this rule, fall on permitting
authorities and sources.”366 Although the relevant sections of the
Clean Air Act explicitly require permits for sources with the
potential to emit 100 or 250 tons per year of “any air pollutant”
(depending on the applicable program and source),367 the agency
pointed out that “immediate application of these thresholds to
sources that emit greenhouse gases would cause permit applications
357. See 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010). 
358. 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
359. Id. at 534. 
360. See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 09-1332, slip op. at 19-20
(D.C. Cir. June 26, 2012) (describing this background).
361. See 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009).
362. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006). 
363. 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010). 
364. U.S. EPA, EPA-457/B-11-001, PSD AND TITLE V PERMITTING GUIDANCE FOR
GREENHOUSE GASES (2011).
365. See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, slip op. at 19-20 (describing these rules). 
366. 75 Fed. Reg. 31,516 (June 3, 2010). 
367. See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). 
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to jump from 280 per year to over 81,000 per year” in one program,
and “from 14,700 per year to over 6.1 million per year” in the other
program.368 The EPA also explained that the vast majority of these
applications would come from small commercial or residential
sources, which would incur an average of either $23,175 or $60,000
in permitting expenses, depending on the program.369 If the permit-
ting authorities hired the 230,000 additional full-time employees
that would likely be necessary to process these permit applications,
“authorities would face over $21 billion in additional permitting
costs each year due to [greenhouse gases], compared to the current
program cost of $62 million each year.”370
Thus, rather than immediately requiring permits for all sources
that exceed the 100 or 250 tons per year emissions threshold, the
EPA decided to implement these programs in several phases,
beginning with the largest sources of greenhouse gas emissions.371
The Tailoring Rule therefore established the first two steps in this
phased-in process. During the first step, the sources that were
already subject to permit obligations based on their emission of
other regulated air pollutants were required to install the best
available control technology for their greenhouse gas emissions.372
During the second step, sources with the potential to emit more
than 75,000 or 100,000 tons per year of greenhouse gases, depend-
ing, again, on the relevant program and source, would be obligated
to obtain the requisite permit.373 The Tailoring Rule also contains
enforceable commitments by the EPA to engage in subsequent rule
making that will be designed to lower the emissions thresholds for
greenhouse gases, streamline the administration of the permitting
programs, and address the permitting of remaining sources with the
potential to emit more than 100 or 250 tons per year of greenhouse
gases under the relevant programs.374 While the EPA acknowledged
368. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, slip op. at 74 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. 31,554 (June 3,
2010)).
369. Id. (quoting 75 Fed. Reg. 31,556, 31,562 (June 10, 2010), 75 Fed. Reg. 31,562 (June 3,
2010)).
370. Id. at 74 (quoting 75 Fed. Reg. 31,563 (June 10, 2010)). 
371. See id. at 74-75. 
372. Id. at 145.
373. Those emissions would be measured on the basis of their carbon dioxide equivalence.
See id. at 114-15.
374. See 75 Fed. Reg. 31,516, 31,522 n.11.
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that the Tailoring Rule is difficult to square with a literal reading
of the text of the Clean Air Act, the agency justified its phased-in
approach based on several administrative law doctrines that give
agencies a certain amount of equitable discretion.375
In Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, a number of
industry groups and “red states” challenged the validity of the
Tailoring Rule on the grounds that the EPA exceeded the scope of
its lawful authority under the Clean Air Act.376 The plaintiffs argued
that none of the doctrines invoked by the EPA allowed the agency
to “depart unilaterally from the [Clean Air Act’s] permitting
thresholds and replace them with numbers of its own choosing.”377
While acknowledging the “lamentable policy consequences of
adhering to the unambiguous numerical thresholds in the Clean Air
Act,” the plaintiffs claimed that the EPA’s attempts to alleviate
those burdens “establish only that the EPA is acting as a benevolent
dictator rather than a tyrant.”378 The D.C. Circuit declined to
address the merits of this claim, however, and dismissed this aspect
of the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing
because they had not alleged an injury in fact that could be
redressed by the court.379 On the contrary, the court observed that
the Tailoring Rule “actually mitigate[s] [plaintiffs’] purported
injuries.”380
This example provides an excellent illustration of several of the
primary claims of this Article. First, statutory interpretation in
federal court should be understood as a mechanism of contestatory
democracy. The plaintiffs in Coalition for Responsible Regulation
brought a lawsuit to challenge the validity of the government’s
decision to adopt the Tailoring Rule, and that is the context in
which issues of statutory interpretation typically arise in the
modern regulatory state. While the court’s decision to dismiss the
complaint for lack of standing seems correct under the existing legal
375. See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, slip op. at 75-76 (describing the EPA’s
arguments); see also Kirti Datla, Note, The Tailoring Rule: Mending the Conflict Between
Plain Text and Agency Resource Constraints, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1989, 1989-92 (2011)
(providing a detailed evaluation of the potential application of one of those doctrines). 
376. See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, slip op. at 75-76. 
377. Id.
378. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
379. See id. at 76-81.
380. Id. at 77. 
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doctrine, such limitations on justiciability impose potentially
problematic barriers on the ability of citizens to challenge the
legality of governmental action.381 Second, if a federal court were to
address the merits of this claim, the Tailoring Rule would be legally
vulnerable if the EPA’s decision is properly understood as statutory
interpretation, and the judiciary feels compelled to follow the plain
meaning of the statutory language. While the EPA went out of its
way to explain why its interpretation of the Clean Air Act is legally
permissible,382 it seems doubtful that the EPA’s decision to enact the
Tailoring Rule is best characterized as “statutory interpretation.”
Rather, the EPA is “carrying out” its delegated authority to “imple-
ment” the Clean Air Act’s permitting programs, and it has under-
standably chosen to do so through a multistep process. Accordingly,
the Tailoring Rule provides a compelling example of Elizabeth
Foote’s concern that routinely treating agency action as “statutory
interpretation” poses the twin risks of judicial aggrandizement (by
increasing the likelihood that courts will engage in law making
under Chevron step one, in this case by invalidating the Tailoring
Rule as contrary to the statute’s plain meaning), as well as judicial
capitulation to the policy choices of agencies (if the court concludes
that the statute is ambiguous, and fails to review the agency’s
“interpretation” for reasoned decision making).383 Third, by adopting
the Tailoring Rule, the agency was, in reality, editing the Clean Air
Act in response to changed or unanticipated circumstances. It is
significant, moreover, that the EPA adopted the rule pursuant to
notice-and-comment rule making, and that its final rule was ac-
companied by a thorough explanation. The questions for the
judiciary, therefore, are (1) whether the EPA’s decision should be
deemed foreclosed by an explicit decision by Congress, and (2)
whether the agency has engaged in reasoned decision making. In
my view, Congress did not unambiguously preclude the EPA’s
adoption of the Tailoring Rule. While Congress adopted numerical
emissions limits when it enacted the Clean Air Act, those emissions
limits were specifically designed to apply only to “big polluters” who
381. See sources cited supra notes 162, 201. 
382. See 75 Fed. Reg. 31,527-66 (June 3, 2010) (describing “the legal and policy rationale
for the final [Tailoring Rule] decision”).
383. See Foote, supra note 169, at 702-10. 
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could afford the costs of being subject to the permitting process.384
Congress never anticipated the problem of climate change, or that
greenhouse gases would be emitted into the atmosphere at such
high levels by so many smaller sources. The agency’s approach to
carrying out its programmatic responsibilities seems like a perfectly
reasonable solution under the circumstances. Indeed, the agency
has avoided what could otherwise be characterized as the arbitrary
domination of the permitting authorities and owners of countless
small businesses and residences. The agency has therefore acted in
a democratic fashion, and its decision should withstand judicial
review. Nonetheless, such opportunities for contestatory democracy
are important because they effectively prevent the agency from truly
acting as a dictator, benign or otherwise.385
One might respond to all of this by claiming that the Clean Air
Act contains unambiguous, numerical emissions limitations, and
that if they need to be tailored to accommodate the regulation of
greenhouse gases, Congress should amend the statute to provide
more appropriate permit thresholds. While this would, in fact, be
the ideal solution because Congress undoubtedly has the primary
authorial role in the lawmaking process, such a solution does not
appear politically feasible at this time. When the legislative process
is this dysfunctional,386 there is nothing undemocratic about
agencies implementing statutes in a reasoned fashion, and the
judiciary reviewing and upholding those decisions. Administrators
and judges might have an obligation to help elected officials take
our society “to hell” if their role is merely to serve as faithful agents
of the legislature,387 but that is decidedly not the case if the point of
384. See 75 Fed. Reg. 31,549-51 (June 3, 2010) (describing the legislative history of the
1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act).
385. This is particularly true when the EPA could have reached the same result in a less
transparent, accountable, or democratic fashion by maintaining the statutory emissions levels
and refusing to enforce the permit requirements below the agency’s chosen thresholds. Such
a course of action would not necessarily have involved public deliberation, and it would
presumptively have been precluded from judicial review. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
837-38 (1985). 
386. Cf. Jonathan Zasloff, Courts in the Age of Dysfunction, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 479
(2012) (discussing shortcomings in the legislature’s treatment of climate change, and claiming
that a certain amount of “judicial prodding” would be appropriate in this context).
387. Cf. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in 1 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916-
1935, at 199 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., abridged ed. by Alger Hiss, 1963) (“I always say, as you
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democracy is to protect the public from arbitrary domination by
private parties or the state.
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AS
CONTESTATORY DEMOCRACY
While viewing statutory interpretation as a mechanism of
contestatory democracy is largely consistent with current judicial
practice, it would have real practical consequences in some cases.
Nonetheless, the more significant result of reconceptualizing
statutory interpretation in this fashion would be theoretical. Not
only does this understanding of statutory interpretation openly
acknowledge the limits of legislative intent and purposive analysis
as tools for providing a single correct answer to statutory problems,
but it also sheds new light on the most fundamental problems with
textualism. This theory additionally provides reasons to give serious
consideration to proposals for increased judicial candor in statutory
interpretation and for judicial review of at least some types of
legislation for due process of law making.
A. Problems with Textualism
Textualism’s most fundamental tenet is the formalist axiom that
the statutory text is the law.388 The role of the judiciary in statutory
interpretation is therefore to ascertain the ordinary meaning of
the law when the statute was enacted.389 Textualists are fond of
demonstrating the simple genius of this method by asking questions
such as whether a prohibition on bringing “dogs” into a restaurant
applies to “cats,”390 or whether the legislative treatment of “sand-
wiches” applies to “burritos.”391 As a reasonable speaker of English,
know, that if my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It’s my job.”) (quoted in
Michael Herz, “Do Justice!” Variations of a Thrice-Told Tale, 82 VA. L. REV. 111, 114 (1996)).
388. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 117, 120 (2009).
389. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
390. Cf. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 41, at 72-73 (pointing out that roosters and goldfish
are both “animals” under a dictionary definition); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE
47-52 (1991) (providing examples involving the exclusion of certain animals from restaurants). 
391. Cf. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 41, at 54-55 (discussing White City Shopping Ctr.,
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I would acknowledge that dogs are different from cats and that a
sandwich is not a burrito, but the main point of this Article is that
courts are not asked to answer these questions in the abstract.
Rather, they are typically asked to answer these questions in the
context of a challenge to the legality of governmental authority.
Moreover, in the modern regulatory state, it would not be unusual
for Congress to delegate authority to an agency to promulgate rules
or orders to prohibit dogs from restaurants or to regulate sand-
wiches. The institutional context in which questions about the
breadth of these categories arises therefore matters. For example,
I would be predisposed to grant a motion to dismiss a criminal
indictment for violating a prohibition on bringing a dog into a
restaurant if the animal at issue was a house cat based on the plain
meaning of the statute. I would, however, also be inclined to dismiss
the indictment if the animal at issue was a guide dog, and the
defendant who was contesting the law’s application was blind. On
the other hand, I would be inclined to deny a motion to dismiss the
indictment if the animal at issue was a dog/tiger hybrid that was
fifty-one percent “cat.” I would be even more inclined to uphold
these particular decisions if they were made by an administrative
agency with delegated authority to implement the relevant statute
after engaging in a process of reasoned deliberation which consid-
ered the views of interested members of the public.392
All of this is to say that the text of a statute is not the law, and
that the meaning of statutory language is not always dispositive. If
the text is not the law, then what is? The answer to this question
cannot be the legislature’s intent, nor can it be the underlying
statutory purpose, because as legal realists and textualists have
both persuasively explained, Congress frequently has no discernible
intent on specific interpretive problems and it pursues its policy
goals in only a limited fashion.393 From the standpoint of
contestatory democracy, the law is what authoritative decision
makers say it is based on a reasoned assessment of the circum-
LP v. PR Rests., LLC, No. 2006196313, 2006 WL 3292641 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2006),
which examined whether a lease that prohibited a shopping center from providing space to
a restaurant that earned more than ten percent of its business from the sale of “sandwiches”
precluded a lease agreement with a Mexican-style restaurant).
392. See supra notes 176-99, 277-81 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 45-59 and accompanying text. 
2013] STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 297
stances presented in a particular case. While agencies and courts
both have a duty to respect Congress’s explicit policy choices when
they make their decisions, unelected bureaucrats and judges will
often be engaging in a “lawmaking” function when they interpret
statutes in a nontextualist fashion. Setting aside the fact that
textualist judges also engage in law making when they resolve
statutory ambiguity, textualists believe that judicial law making is
undemocratic.394 If, however, the point of democracy is to limit the
government’s capacity to engage in arbitrary domination of the
people, then it would be democratically illegitimate to follow the
plain meaning of statutory text when its purposes would not be
served or serious adverse consequences would result, unless such an
outcome was fully anticipated and rationally endorsed by elected
representatives of the people.395 Indeed, using the plain meaning of
statutory language to resolve unanticipated problems would
typically lead to random and, hence, arbitrary results.396 In contrast,
by providing administrative agencies with the authority to use their
expertise to implement statutory programs in a sensible fashion
pursuant to deliberative processes, the government’s capacity to
engage in arbitrary domination of the people is restricted. This is
particularly true when administrative decisions are subject to
judicial review for compatibility with the statutory scheme and
reasoned decision making. If neither Congress nor an agency has
resolved the precise question at issue in a reasoned fashion, then
this authority necessarily falls to the judiciary, which should make
a reasoned decision on the merits in light of all of the relevant
considerations when a particular exercise of governmental authority
is contested. The people are thereby provided with a variety of
different forums for potentially contesting legal or policy decisions,
and individuals cannot be adversely affected by governmental action
unless a reasoned decision that considered their interests and
perspectives was provided at some point during the process.
394. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 62, at 9 (observing that judicial law making under the
common law “would be an unqualified good, were it not for a trend in government that has
developed in recent centuries, called democracy”).
395. See Staszewski, supra note 70, at 1025-28 (explaining how the absurdity doctrine in
statutory interpretation promotes republican democracy). 
396. See Staszewski, supra note 147, at 1309-10. 
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The meaning of statutory language is obviously important and
should generally be followed because Congress has the primary
authorial role in the lawmaking process, and good editors do not
ignore or casually revise the texts of the projects for which they
are responsible, especially when there may be significant reliance
interests at stake. Nonetheless, a variety of other factors will or-
dinarily be relevant when agencies and judges make their decisions,
including the legislative history of the statute, its underlying
purposes, applicable legal precedent, canons of construction,
constitutional norms, related statutory provisions and common law
principles, a potentially broad range of policy considerations, and
how things have changed since the statute was enacted.397 The
important point for present purposes is that while traditional
theories of statutory interpretation assume that the role of agencies
and courts is to ascertain the meaning of the law,398 and recent
literature debates whether they should perform this task in the
same fashion,399 the reality is that neither agencies nor courts are
“ascertaining the meaning of the law” when they interpret statutes
in the modern regulatory state. Rather, administrative agencies are
carrying out their delegated authority to implement statutory
programs, while the judiciary is generally reviewing the legality of
their decisions.400 Agencies are making policy decisions within the
constraints provided by Congress, and the judiciary is providing the
people with opportunities to contest the validity of exercises of
governmental authority. If courts were to follow the “plain meaning”
of statutes regardless of the circumstances or the consequences,
they would be failing to perform their central function in statutory
interpretation.401 Statutory interpretation in the modern regulatory
397. See supra notes 284-97 and accompanying text.
398. For thoughtful jurisprudential discussions of the complexities of this proposition, see,
for example, SCHAUER, supra note 390, at 51; Kent Greenawalt, The Nature of Rules and the
Meaning of Meaning, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1449 (1997). See also Morell E. Mullins, Sr.,
Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of Statutory Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 43-46 (2003)
(describing and criticizing this view of statutory interpretation). 
399. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text. 
400. See Herz, supra note 187, at 119 (recognizing that when agencies resolve statutory
ambiguity, “the court and agency are doing different things,” and explaining that “[n]either
is trying to figure out what the statute means” because “[t]he agency is making policy, [and]
the court is ensuring that the agency has not abused its discretion in doing so”). 
401. Pragmatic theories of textualism, which seek to simplify statutory interpretation to
minimize “judicial mistakes,” are therefore based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the
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state may no longer be “all about words,”402 but it does have the
potential to improve the legitimacy of legislation, administration,
and adjudication under the only understanding of democracy that
is properly connected to the requirements of individual freedom.403
B. Reassessing Due Process of Law Making and Judicial Candor
Contestatory democracy requires reasoned decision making on
legal and policy issues by public officials. This can legitimately occur
when a statute is enacted by Congress or when a statute is imple-
mented by an administrative agency. If a statutory problem is not
resolved in a reasoned fashion by either Congress or an agency, this
task necessarily falls to the judiciary. Because agency decision
making is typically subject to judicial review for reasoned decision
making,404 it is more likely that Congress or the judiciary will retain
the capacity to dominate the people arbitrarily. The safeguards of
representation and bicameralism and presentment help limit
arbitrary domination by Congress, and the judiciary must give
reasoned explanations for its decisions, but one can still fairly
question whether these protections are sufficient. We should
therefore give serious consideration to reforms that could improve
the quality of legislative and judicial deliberations and the justifica-
tions that elected officials and judges provide for their decisions.
This means, for example, that we may want to reconsider the
potential value of judicial review of legislation for due process of law
making, and that we should almost certainly encourage courts to be
more candid about their role in making interpretive decisions.405
“Due process of law making” is a term that was originally coined
by Hans Linde to describe judicial review of the validity of legisla-
judiciary’s role in this enterprise. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
(2006). 
402. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990 (2001). 
403. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
404. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 27, 43 (1983). Agencies can also arbitrarily dominate the people when judicial
review is not available. For more extensive discussions of this problem, and some potential
solutions, see, for example, Criddle, supra note 97, at 193-96, and Staszewski, supra note 162. 
405. For an excellent treatment of judicial candor and sincerity, see Micah J. Schwartzman,
Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987 (2008).
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tion that focuses on the adequacy of lawmaking procedures or the
quality of legislative deliberations.406 Despite occasional objections,
it is widely accepted that it is appropriate for courts to review an
administrative record to determine whether agency officials engaged
in reasoned decision making during the legislative rulemaking
process.407 In contrast, the Supreme Court provoked a flood of
scholarly criticism when it recently assessed the constitutionality of
several federal statutes by closely examining the contents of the
legislative records.408 This reflects the conventional wisdom that it
is inappropriate for courts to review a legislative record to assess
the constitutional validity of ordinary legislation for several related
reasons.409 First, there is no constitutional requirement that the
legislative branch compile a formal lawmaking record sufficient for
courts to assess the rationale for a law’s enactment. Second, the
existing legislative records are unlikely to provide a fully transpar-
ent, coherent, or authoritative window into Congress’s reasoning
because the legislative process is so diffuse, competitive, and
legitimately susceptible to a wide range of informal influences.410
406. See Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 225 (1976); see
also Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the
Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1709-18 (2002)
(describing various models of due process of law making, including the model of due
deliberation); Staszewski, supra note 230, at 465-76 (discussing the relevant literature and
evaluating the potential applicability of this method of judicial review to successful ballot
measures). 
407. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Shapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN.
L. REV. 87, 126 (2001). 
408. See Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914, 934-35 (2012) (describing
legislative record review and the resulting academic critique); Staszewski, supra note 230, at
465 & n.249 (collecting sources). 
409. See Staszewski, supra note 230, at 466-68 (describing the most prevalent criticisms). 
410. Critics of the Court’s recent foray into judicial review for due process of law making
correctly observed that the Court’s practice was in severe tension with the textualist approach
to statutory interpretation that is advocated by two members of the Court’s majority. See
Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 136-41 (2001);
Frickey & Smith, supra note 406, at 1750-52. One might therefore conclude that the criticisms
of judicial review for due process of law making also apply to my earlier claims that agencies
and courts are obligated to follow the explicit policy choices of the legislature, and that they
should rely on legislative history to help make these determinations. I do not believe that this
follows for at least two reasons. First, when agencies and courts use the legislative history to
ascertain what the legislature decided, they are not required to evaluate the reasons for
Congress’s decisions or whether elected representatives adequately considered and responded
to competing interests and perspectives, which would be important aspects of judicial review
for due process of law making. Second, when agencies or courts determine that Congress did
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Finally, the judicial invalidation of statutes based on perceived
deficiencies in the legislative process raises serious separation of
powers concerns because Congress is a coordinate branch of gov-
ernment that is authorized by the Constitution to make laws within
the scope of its enumerated powers, and it is therefore troubling for
courts to tell Congress how to do its job.
On the other hand, it is equally troubling for Congress to exercise
lawmaking authority without engaging in reasoned deliberation or
providing reasoned explanations for its policy decisions. Judicial
review of the validity of legislation for due process of law making is
potentially justified by an admirable desire to limit the arbitrary
domination of the people by Congress. Meanwhile, however, this
authority would increase the potential for arbitrary domination by
courts, especially if Congress is routinely unable to produce a
legislative record that satisfies the requirements of deliberative
democratic theory.411 My sense is that judicial review of ordinary
legislation for due process of law making is therefore unduly strong
medicine, particularly because the remedy would typically involve
invalidating a statute on constitutional grounds, which would
frequently cause more harm than good. The democratic shortcom-
ings of the legislative process mirror the failings of the elective mode
of democracy; they tend to operate at relatively high levels of
abstraction and place heavy reliance on majoritarian concerns,
while neglecting the substantive merits of detailed policy questions
that will arise during the course of governance and the views of
individuals or groups without political power.412 The best solution
for these shortcomings is to provide the people with opportunities
for contestatory democracy, including notice-and-comment rule
making by administrative agencies and statutory interpretation by
courts, as well as substantive judicial review under the Constitu-
tion. The theory of statutory interpretation that is set forth in this
not explicitly resolve the precise question at issue during the course of statutory inter-
pretation, the result is greater discretion for agencies and courts to reach a reasoned decision
on that issue. In contrast, Congress’s failure to resolve an issue in a reasoned fashion could
lead to the invalidation of the statute on constitutional grounds under judicial review for due
process of law making. Accordingly, the stakes of the judiciary’s decisions, and the
consequences of any difficulties or mistakes, are much greater in the latter context. 
411. See Frickey & Smith, supra note 406, at 1736-37 (claiming that Congress cannot
satisfy a judicially enforceable requirement for due deliberation). 
412. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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Article is therefore self-consciously designed to counteract the
deliberative failures of the legislative process, without resorting to
judicial review of legislation for due process of law making. There
may, however, still be a need for some version of the latter form of
recourse for certain types of statutes, such as omnibus legislation or
successful ballot initiatives, where the deliberative failures of the
lawmaking processes are particularly stark.413
If statutory interpretation is to provide the type of reasoned
deliberation on specific legal and policy questions that is frequently
absent from the legislative process, then the judiciary must continue
to ensure that agencies do not exceed the explicit limits of their
delegated authority and that they exercise their policy-making
discretion in a reasoned fashion. When agencies are not involved or
have not resolved the legal or policy questions at issue in a reasoned
fashion, then the judiciary must either remand the matter to the
agency or make a reasoned decision on its own. In the latter
situation, which is the traditional domain of statutory interpreta-
tion, courts will sometimes be able to identify and follow an explicit
directive from the legislature. In many cases, however, courts will
need to make their own legal or policy choices, and there is no use
pretending that they are acting as the faithful agents of Congress in
doing so. This Article has argued that to the extent that courts are
providing the people with meaningful opportunities to contest the
validity of governmental action, there is no reason to disparage their
work as undemocratic.
Statutory interpretation best promotes democratic legitimacy and
freedom as nondomination when the judiciary gives reasoned
explanations for its decisions that could reasonably be accepted by
people with fundamentally competing interests and perspectives.
The fact that courts appear to resolve most statutory disputes by
engaging in a process of practical reasoning suggests that this is
already taking place to some extent. Nonetheless, explicitly
recognizing that statutory interpretation in the modern regulatory
413. See GLEN S. KRUTZ, HITCHING A RIDE: OMNIBUS LEGISLATING IN THE U.S. CONGRESS
1-7 (2001) (explaining that omnibus packages “typically contain a nucleus that has
widespread support in Congress” and that controversial attachments can be “tucked away”
in such measures because members “are seldom aware of the minutiae of omnibus packages”);
Staszewski, supra note 230, at 465-76 (claiming that judicial review for due process of law-
making is appropriate in the ballot initiative context). 
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state serves as a mechanism of contestatory democracy provides
some guidelines for improving the judiciary’s performance. First,
courts should give equal consideration to competing views when
they resolve statutory disputes, and judicial opinions should be
responsive to the arguments of the parties. While these are
standard elements of legitimate adjudication,414 courts should also
acknowledge the extent of their policy-making discretion and
explain the rationale for their decisions. Several commentators have
recognized that courts use faithful agent theory as a fiction to
disclaim their own responsibility for making decisions in statutory
interpretation because of widespread concerns about the democratic
legitimacy of judicial law making in this context.415 If statutory
interpretation is properly viewed as a mechanism of contestatory
democracy, this fiction should no longer be necessary. There is
nothing undemocratic about a judicial decision that candidly
explains, for example, that (1) Congress left a particular statutory
problem open, (2) the responsible agency has not considered or
resolved the matter in a reasoned fashion or the judiciary was
delegated this authority, and (3) here is what we think and why. On
the contrary, it is only when courts take responsibility for their own
legal or policy choices and seek to justify their decisions in public-
regarding terms that the judiciary can be held more fully account-
able for the exercise of lawmaking discretion that is inevitable when
they interpret statutes in the modern regulatory state.
CONCLUSION
The countermajoritarian difficulty in statutory interpretation can
be resolved by applying recent insights from civic republican theory
to the adjudication of statutory disputes in the regulatory state.
From a republican perspective, freedom consists of the absence of
the potential for arbitrary domination, and democracy should
therefore include both electoral and contestatory dimensions. This
Article has argued that statutory interpretation in the modern
414. See Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the
Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 137-60 (2005) (discussing the classic model of adjudication,
the public law model, and the relationship between the public law and classic models, as well
as the significance of judicial candor). 
415. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 244, at 363-64; Zeppos, supra note 14, at 386.
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regulatory state is best understood as a mechanism of contestatory
democracy. This theory suggests distinct roles for Congress,
administrative agencies, and the judiciary in the making and
implementation of statutes, which are both descriptively plausible
and normatively attractive. It also undermines the fundamental
tenets of textualist theory and has important implications for the
merits of judicial review for due process of law making and the
benefits of increased candor in judicial decision making.
